326 CREATWE SCIENCE 



call accidental discoveries. Accounts of such discoveries normally 

 attach primacy to the observation of some startling fact. But why do 

 we take notice of that particular fact, why are we startled? Precisely 

 because the fact stands out from some "horizon of expectations" 

 (Popper) set by prior hypotheses earlier perhaps completely im- 

 plicit. 



Important in itself, the primacy of hypothesis is important too for 

 the serious problem it raises when the hypothesis is explicit and 

 strongly held. Columbus, the very archetype of bold discoverer, viv- 

 idly exemplifies that problem in a simple non-scientific context. 

 Launched on his voyages by and with the passionate conviction that 

 he could reach China and India by sailing to the West, Columbus 

 never came to question that conviction. He never recognized that he 

 hod not reached China or India. Landed in the New World, he never 

 recognized it as a. New World and so, in a sense, failed fully to dis- 

 cover it. In science, too, we begin our observations and experiments 

 with hypotheses and presuppositions to which we may be as deeply 

 committed as was Columbus to his. How do we bring ourselves to 

 recognize, often in situations of only marginal clarity, an appearance 

 implying failure of a long-cherished inspiration, perhaps the trusted 

 guide for a whole line of investigation? 



The Attitude of the Investigator 



Mythical Method enjoins an attitude of icy agnosticism also, as 

 Polanyi suggests, strictly mythical. 



A scientist must commit himself in respect to any important claim put 

 forward within his field of knowledge. If he ignores the claim he does 

 in fact imply that he believes it to be unfomided. If he takes notice of 

 it, the time and attention which he diverts to its examination and the 

 extent to which he takes account of it in guiding his own investiga- 

 tions are a measure of the likelihood he ascribes to its validity. Only if 

 a claim lies totally outside his range of responsible interests can the 

 scientist assume an attitude of completely impartial doubt toward it. 



The only pure form of open-mindedness will then, appropriately 

 enough, be found in finest flower only in the empty-minded who, we 

 find, do not make scientific history. Indeed, the historical record 

 shows some of the greatest scientists "lamentably" far indeed from 



