XXVm JAMES A. WEISHEIPL 



of essential natures. In other words, without knowledge of the 

 essential nature of the subject and the property, there can be 

 no demonstration; there can be no scientific knowledge properly 

 so called. The anomaly of M. Maritain's position is that he 

 reconciles modern empirioschematic science with Thomistic 

 philosophy of nature by depreciating modern science. Un- 

 doubtedly there are many areas of modern ' science ' which are 

 superficially descriptive, tentative and dialectical in content. 

 If, on the other hand, there are areas of modern science which 

 truly attain essential natures and through them demonstrate 

 characteristic attributes, as often seems to be the case in the 

 biological sciences, then the situation is very different from that 

 presented by M. Maritain. 



A better solution was recognized by Fr. Aniceto Fernandez- 

 Alonso, O. P. In 1936 he published a remarkable paper entitled 

 " Scientiae et Philosophia secundum S. Albertum Magnum." 

 Examining the scholastic scene of the 1930's, Fr. Fernandez 

 saw that all scholastics wished to recognize a real distinction 

 between modem science and Aristotelian philosophy. This dis- 

 tinction was variously described as one of content (accidental 

 relations vs. substantial essences, phenomena vs. noumena, 

 sensible vs. intelligible) or one of method (inductive vs. de- 

 ductive, proximate causes vs. ultimate causes, quia demonstra- 

 tions vs. propter quid demonstrations) . Fr. Fernandez then 

 went on to show that none of these can differentiate the specu- 

 lative sciences, for every science, whether it be called empirical 

 or philosophical, must deal with substance and accidents, must 

 be intelligible and sensible; further, every science must be in- 

 ductive and deductive, must demonstrate through immediate 

 (propter quid) and remote (quia) causes. Fr. Fernandez's 

 own view can be summarized briefly in three propositions, each 

 of which he proves at great length. (1) All modern science and 

 all natural philosophy are specifically distinct from metaphysics. 

 (2) All sciences formally illuminated by mathematical prin- 

 ciples are specifically distinct from sciences of nature, although 

 materially they all study the same physical universe. (3) Aris- 



