DEMONSTRATION AND SELF-EVIDENCE 



I. Scientific Methodology 



IT can be forcefully argiied that there is no place in phi- 

 losophy for an " epistemological critique " of knowledge, 

 as though the integrity of the intellect stood in doubt till 

 it was somehow philosophically " cleared." ^ Surely, for reason 

 to attempt to establish the trustworthiness of reason is for it 

 to try to pull itself up by its own epistemological boot 

 straps. The history of thought gives ample evidence that criti- 

 cal attempts to justify the philosophical effort are in vain. No 

 m.atter how honest the epistemological critique in intention, 

 it results characteristically in an unnatural imposition of 

 artificial limits placed upon our capacities to know. Witness 

 the divergent streams of extreme rationalism and extreme 

 empiricism which find their source in the critique of Descartes.^ 

 Significantly, St. Thomas did not find it necessary to initiate his 

 philosophical effort with a critique of knowledge. A Thomist 

 speaks meaningfully of epistemology best in reference to a 

 metaphysical inquiry into the character of intentional being. 

 He takes epistemology as an attempt to understand what it is 

 to know, not an attempt to defend the radical integrity of our 



^ Cf., Gilson, fitienne, Realisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance (Paris: 

 J. Vrin, 1947) ; Realisme Methodique (Paris: P. Teque, 1935) . 



^ Gilson 's frequently quoted remark on Berkeley and the Cartesian critique bears 

 repetition here: " Everyone is free to decide whether he shall begin to philosophize 

 as a pure mind; if he should elect to do so the difHculty will not be how to get 

 into the mind, but how to get out of it. Four great men have tried it and failed. 

 Berkeley's own achievement was to realize at last, that it was a useless and foolish 

 thing even to try it. In this sense at least, it is true to say that Berkeley brought 

 Descartes' ' noble experiment ' to a close, and for that reason his work should always 

 remain as a landmark in the history of philosophy." The Unity of Philosophical 

 Experience (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1937) , pp. 196-197. 



