12 EDWARD D. SIMMONS 



propositions are not totally non-empirical, for, as we shall note, 

 they are known by way of an immediate induction from sensible 

 data. Yet they do not depend directly upon empirical data 

 for verification. Assent to them is founded upon an intelligi- 

 bility built into them such that it is impossible to think the 

 opposite. Thus, if one understands the meanings of the terms 

 in the proposition The whole is greater than any of its parts 

 one immediately assents to this proposition quite apart from 

 the existence of this or that sensibly existing whole or part. 

 The motive for assent is, in a sense, built into the proposition 

 itself. The self-evident proposition is immediate because it 

 looks to no prior proposition for its evidence, but there are 

 propositions which are evident in this way without being self 

 evident. These are the factually evident propositions which 

 are true, because they report accurately on the way things 

 happen in fact to be, whether they could be otherwise or not. 

 Examples of propositions like this are This pencil is yellow, 

 The weather is pleasant today, and / feel great. These proposi- 

 tions are immediate since they do not depend on prior proposi- 

 tions to manifest their truth. The evidence for them is found 

 immediately in the factual situation. Insofar as a factually 

 evident proposition is formally characterized by its commit- 

 ment to what happens to be the case, the factually evident 

 proposition cannot intend the necessity needed for an absolute 

 premise of demonstration. Thus, though each is immediate, 

 the factually evident proposition differs radically from the self- 

 evident proposition.^^ In the Commentary on the Physics St. 



sicut conclusiones demonstratae, quando apparent; quae si negentur, oportet negari 

 prima principia, ex quibus ex necessitate consequuntur." Cf., among other texts 

 of this type, In I Post. Anal, lect. 5; lect. 19; De Ver., q. 11, a. 1; Stimma, I, q. 17, 

 a. 3 ad 2; q. 82, a. 2; q. 85, a. 6; De Malo, q. 16, a. 7 ad 18; Quodl., VIII, a. 4. 



^^ What I refer to as the " factually evident " proposition is usually spoken of 

 simply as " evident," but since the self-evident is (at least) evident it seems better 

 to use a more determinate expression. There is nothing highly sophisticated intended 

 by my use of " factually," despite the fact that the word " fact " does frequently 

 take on a very specialized meaning in philosophical discussion. Note that none of 

 my examples involves necessary matter in any sense. This helps to make the notion 

 of the factually evident quite clear. Nonetheless it seems to me that This whole 



