26 EDWARD D. SIMMONS 



stralion and the worth of its conclusions. Thus, in this final 

 chapter, Aristotle defends the integrity of the principles them- 

 selves in terms of an intuitive induction from the incontro- 

 vertible data of sense experience. St. Thomas points out that 

 the difference between dialectical discourse and demonstration 

 is the difference between unterminated and terminated dis- 

 course.'*^ The dialectician falls short of being a scientist pre- 

 cisely because dialectical conclusions are not finally grounded 

 in the real. The dialectical method can be referred to as a 

 " rational method " precisely insofar as its conclusions remain 

 within the reason. The demonstrative method is the method 

 of science because it grounds its conclusions necessarily in the 

 real — and it does this insofar as it resolves them into self- 

 evident propositions. There is no science save that there be 

 a rational progression from principles to scientific conclusions. 

 Thus the scientific intellect is of necessity a ratio. But, at the 

 same time, there is no science save that there be an intuition of 

 basic principles — so that the scientific intellect is also an 

 intellectus.^^ Demonstration may be an instrument of the 

 intellect as reason, but there can be no meaningful theory of 

 demonstration save that the per se nota proposition, itself 

 properly the object of intellect as intellect, be significantly a 

 part of that theory. 



Edward D. Simmons 



Marquette University, 



Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 



^^ In Boeth. de Trin., q. 6, a. 1 ad 1: "Alio modo dicitur processus rationalis ex 

 termino, in quo sistitur procedendo. Ultimus enim terminus, ad quem rationis 

 inquisitio perducere debet, est intelleclus principiorum, in quae resolvendo iudicamus; 

 quod quidem quando fit, non dicitur processus vel probatio rationabilis, sed demon- 

 stratio. Quandoque autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad ultimum terminum 

 perduci, sed sistitur in ipsa inquisitione, quando per probabiles rationes proceditur, 

 quae natae sunt facere opinionem vel fidem, non scientiam, et sic rationabilis pro- 

 cessus dividitur contra demonstrativum." 



*^ Summa, I-II, q. 57, a. 2: " Verum autem est dupliciter considerabile; uno modo, 

 sicut per se notum; alio modo, sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, 

 se habet ut principium, et percipitur statim ab intellectu; et ideo habitus perficiens 

 intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem vocatur intellectus qui est habitus 

 principiorum." In Boeth. de Trin., q. 6, a. 1 ad 1: "Ultimus enim terminus, ad 

 quem rationis inquisitio perducere debet, est intellectus principiorum, in quae 

 resolvendo iudicamus. ..." 



