SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNIVERSAL UT NUNC 31 



whether B belongs to A, or whether B is common to A and C, 

 or a commensurate property of B, but that there can also be 

 uncertainty concerning what the term A exactly stands for. If 

 A and B are known exactly, then their relationship can be 

 known exactly too. But if they are not known exactly for 

 what they are, their relationship will be proportionally vague 

 and provisional. 



There is a difference, then, between a universal ut nunc as a 

 simple term, viz.. A, and as a subject or a property in an 

 enunciation, such as "All A is B." The following questions 

 remain open: "Is A.?" ''Is B.? " "Is AB.? " The first two 

 concern the bearing of the names: do these definite names refer 

 to something we know definitely? The answer to the other 

 question is obvious: the relation of A to B is either definitely 

 known or it is provisionally posited. Yet why should we posit 

 names and relations provisionally .^^ Why not wait until we 

 know the named exactly and, in the case of enunciation, until 

 we know the exact relation .^^ 



This brings us to the very heart of scientific method and 

 to the relevance of the theory of positing a universal " for the 

 time being " in the practice of science. We must, for the 

 time being, posit such universals and wait to see what happens 

 for having posited them. But let us not suppose that " to see 

 what happens " is merely a passive attitude. The very positing 

 must suggest an activity, a further induction or experimen- 

 tation, with attendant hypotheses and theory which give 

 further meaning to the original positing. To posit a universal 

 ut nunc is to advance something that not only requires further 

 testing but also suggests it. 



Now had we confined ourselves to predicating something of 

 a universal nature (or of a quasi-universal nature) by reason 

 of what is verified in its inferior singulars, the matter would 

 be immediately closed and settled. For, if Socrates walks, we 

 are quite justified in saying that " man walks," and that's the 

 end of it. But if we say " man is an animal," this must be true 

 of every man, not just of this man. However, this mode of 



