56 HERBERT ALBERT RATNER 



teen dialectical propositions and replies. He concludes, " From 

 these and many other considerations it is plain that what has 

 been said on the motion and use of the heart and arteries must 

 seem obscure, inconsistent, or impossible to the thoughtful 

 student. It will therefore be proper to investigate the matter 

 more closely, to study the motion of the heart and arteries not 

 only in man but in all animals possessing a heart, and to search 

 out and find the truth by frequent vivisections and by constant 

 ocular inspection." 



This doxographic approach is distinctly Aristotelian,'^ and 

 establishes that one should not lean on man as the final author- 

 ity.^^ In Ch. 1, he indicates that nature, despite the difficulty 

 of extracting answers from her, is the final authority. 



28 



'" It is part of Aristotle's methodology to examine dialectically existing opinion 

 before proceeding to the scientific investigation of things. Examples of this pro- 

 cedure are found in Physics, Bk. 1, ch. 2; Generation and Corruption, Bk. 1, ch. 1; 

 The Soul., Bk. 1, ch. 2, and elsewhere. The following passage from On the Heavens 

 states some of the reasons for the procedure: " Let us start with a review of the 

 theories of other thinkers; for the proofs of a theory are difficulties for the contrary 

 theory. Besides, those who have fu-st heard the pleas of our adversaries will be 

 more likely to credit the assertions which we are going to make. We shall be less 

 open to the charge of procuring judgment by default" (Bk. 1, ch. 10, 279 b 6-11). 

 " We may convince ourselves not only by the arguments already set forth but 

 also by a consideration of the views of those who differ from us ... If our view 

 is a possible one . . . and [what] they assert is impossible, this fact will be a 

 great weight in convincing us . . ." (Bk. 2, ch. 1, 283 b 30-a) . All translations 

 from Aristotle are from the Oxford edition of his works. 



^' The true Aristotelian tradition may be gathered from the following statements: 



" We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly 

 what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphUl one by the 

 fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would 

 perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining 

 the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers 

 or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth 

 above our friends." (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, ch. 6, 1096a 11-16). 



" He who believes Aristotle to be a god ought to believe that he never made a 

 mistake. But whoever thinks him to have been a man must admit that he was as 

 liable to make mistakes as the rest of us." (St. Albert the Great, Physicorum lib. 

 VIII, tr. I, cap. 14, ed. Borgnet, III, p. 553). 



" Unless a man holds truth dearer than friends, he will be ready to pronounce 

 false judgments and to bear false witness for the sake of friends. But that is 

 immoral. All men ought to hold truth dearer than friends, because all men have 

 the use of reason. But this duty is particularly binding on all philosophers, be- 



