98 RICHARD MCKEON 



Philosophers say that in this Divinity, which is maker and 

 governor of all things, power, wisdom, and will are present, 

 corresponding to the persons of the Trinity, power to the 

 Father, wisdom to the Son, and will to the Holy Spirit. 



In this work William only touches on the world soul, enu- 

 merating three opinions about it. Some think the world Soul 

 is the Holy Spirit, for all things which live in the world 

 live by the divine goodness and will which is the Holy Spirit. 

 Some think that it is a natural vigor placed by God in the 

 world by which some beings only live and others live and 

 perceive and think; some, finally, think that it is a kind of 

 incorporeal substance which is whole in each body although 

 it does not perform the same functions or operations in all 

 because of the comparative slowness of some bodies. In his 

 Gloss on Boethius, however, William states his own doctrine, 

 characteristically combining aspects of the three: the world 

 soul is a natural vigor by which all things have their being, 

 their motion, their growth, perception, life, reason; its effects 

 differ in different subjects; and the natural vigor is the Holy 

 Spirit. William's discussion of the third kind of incorporeals, 

 demons, is based, as his critics were quick to point out, on 

 Plato as well as on Scripture and the Fathers. William argues 

 that even Plato's division of good demons (kalodaimones) into 

 two genera is not inconsistent with the Scriptural division of 

 angels into nine orders, since Plato divides them according to 

 the places they occupy and the Bible according to the functions 

 they perform. The treatment of the fourth kind of incorporeals, 

 souls of men, is postponed to the consideration of man in 

 Book IV. 



When William makes the transition from things which are 

 and are not seen to things which are and are seen, he warns 

 the reader that his manner of presentation must change since 

 his exposition will use either statements that are probable and 

 not necessary or statements that are necessary and not prob- 

 able, " for as philosophers we posit the necessary even if it is 

 not probable, and as physicists we add the probable even if 



