THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE 



UNITY OF FORM 



THE philosophical problem with which we are here con- 

 cerned may briefly be formulated thus: Whether in 

 one and the same individual, remaining essentially 

 one, there are many substantial forms or only one. 



A concrete thing of matter and form, the crwoXov, is one 

 essence and one nature, but it possesses several perfections and 

 activities. It is, in fact, a body, corpus, and it is such and such 

 a body, a stone or a tree or a horse. A tree is a body, but it is a 

 determinate body, quite different from a stone or a horse; 

 besides being a corporeal thing, it is also a living thing. Now, 

 as Boethius has it, it is the form that confers on matter the 

 actual being: ovme esse ex jorma est.^ A substantial form 

 imparts an essential perfection, and an accidental form a rela- 

 tive or qualified perfection. Assuming that substantial form is 

 the determining principle of a composite being, the difficulty 

 arises of how to account for the various essential perfections of 

 an individual. Does one substantial form give one perfection 

 only, so that we have to look for as many substantial forms 

 as there are perfections and activities; or does a single form 

 suffice to determine the thing in its own nature, thus endowing 

 it with all its perfections and activities. f^ A stone is a corporeal 

 thing as much as a piece of iron, and man is as much a living 

 being as a tree or a horse; but as a horse possesses some per- 

 fections which a tree has not, for example, sensitive life, so man, 

 besides having nutritive and sense powers, is also endowed with 

 an intellective soul. 



The whole point of the discussion, therefore, comes to this: 

 Is a man — let us say rnan, for it was in connection with the 

 human soul that the vexed question was first stated — a living 



^Boethius, De trinitate, c. 2 (The Theological Tractates, ed. H. F. Stewart and 

 E. K. Rand. London, 1926, p. 8; PL 64, 1250 B). 



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