122 DANIEL A. CALLUS 



being by virtue of a distinct nutritive soul, an animal through 

 a distinct sensitive soul, and finally rational by an intellective 

 soul; or does he owe to one single substantial form, the intel- 

 lective soul, not only his being a man, or rational, but also 

 his being an animal, a living thing, and a corporal substance? 

 If with Aristotle one holds (i) that prime matter is a com- 

 pletely passive potency without any actuality of its own what- 

 ever; (ii) that privation is the disappearance of the previous 

 form, and, consequently, has no part at all in the composition of 

 the substance; and (iii) that substantial form is absolutely the 

 first determining principle, which makes the thing to be what it 

 is, the only root of actuality, unity and perfection of the thing; 

 then, consistent with his stated principles, the conclusion forced 

 upon us is that in one and the same individual there can 

 be but one single substantial form: other forms, that come 

 after the first, are simply accidental and not substantial forms. 

 Since the thing is already constituted in its own being, they 

 cannot give substantial being, but exclusively accidental or 

 qualified being; they do not confer upon the concrete thing its 

 own definite and specific kind of being, e. g., man, but only a 

 qualified or relative state of being, for example, of being fair 

 or dark, big or small, and the like. 



On the other hand, if one contends (i) that primary matter is 

 not absolutely passive and potential, but possesses in itself 

 some actuality, no matter how incomplete or imperfect it may 

 be: an incohatio farmae, or any active power; (ii) that priva- 

 tion does not mean the complete disappearance of the previous 

 form, so that matter is not stripped of all precedent forais in the 

 process of becoming; or (iii) that substantial form either meets 

 with some actuality in prime matter or does not determine the 

 composite wholly and entirely, but only partially; from all this 

 it will necessarily follow that there are in one and the same 

 individual plurality of forms. 



Briefly, the utimate philosophical issue resolves itself as 

 follows: 



(a) Do the various substantial forms, as imparting different 



