128 DANIEL A. CALLUS 



human soul, while possessing a multiplicity of powers, namely 

 vegetative, sensitive and rational, is essentially one; for it is 

 one and the same principle that gives life and movement, and 

 governs and acts in man/° 



Gundissalinus is known to us not only as a translator, but 

 also as an author. His treatises, in which he made full use of 

 his own translations, chiefly of Avicenna and Gebirol, are 

 important not so much for his personal contribution to medieval 

 thought — for he is rather a compiler than an original thinker — 

 as for his being the first to utilize and attempt a systematic 

 exposition of the new learning, thus opening up fresh subjects 



constituens speciem et perficiens earn. Res enim habentes animas diversas fiunf 

 propter eas diversarum specierum, et fit earum alteritas specie non singularitate; 

 ergo anima non est de accidentibus quibus non specificantur species, nee recipiuntur 

 in constitutione subiecti. Anima enim est perfectio substantiae, non ut accidens." 

 De anima, I, c. 3 ( ed. cit., fol. 4ra) . I have collated Avicenna's text with Bodleian 

 Library, Oxford, MS Bodl. 463 (S. C. 2456). 



^° " Postea autem declarabitur tibi quod anima una est ex qua defluunt hae vires 

 in membra, sed praecedit actio aliquarum, et consequitur actio aliarum secundum 

 aptitudinem instrumenti. Ergo anima quae est in omni animali ipsa est congregans 

 principia sive materias sui corporis, et coniungens et componens eas eo modo quo 

 mereantur fieri corpus eius; et ipsa est conservans hoc corpus secundum ordinem quo 

 decet, et propter eam non dissolvunt illud extrinseca permanentia, quamdiu anima 

 fuerit in illo, alioquin non remaneret in propria sanitate." Ibid., fol. 3vb. Cf. P. V, 

 cap. 7, fol. 27r S. — Deviating, however, from his own principles, Avicenna held 

 that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed bodies, an 

 inconsistency which cannot be explained save by assuming that he did not foresee 

 all the consequences implied in his premises. See Sufficientia, I, c. 10, fol. 19rb; 

 Metaph., VIII, c. 2, fol. 97vb-98ra; De anima, IV, c. 5. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa 

 tkeologiae, I, q. 76, a. 4 ad 4. It has also been urged that Avicenna's theory on 

 the forma corporeitatis is in support of the pluralist view. That it may be inter- 

 preted as advocating pluralism is beyond doubt. In this sense it was understood 

 and criticized by Averroes. The phrase itself is ambiguous, and because of its 

 ambiguitj' it was avoided by Aquinas. Nevertheless, it seems to have a different 

 meaning in Avicenna, as M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Le " De Ente et Essentia " de s. 

 Thomas d'Aquin [Bibliotheque Thomiste, VIII; Kain, 1926] pp. 104 fl.) , A. Forest 

 (La structure metaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin [Etudes de 

 Philosophic medievale, XIV; Paris, 1931] pp. 189 ff.) and others maintain. At any 

 rate, Avicenna himself did not use it, it seems, in the sense assumed by the 

 pluralists, namely as meaning the first substantial form that makes matter to be a 

 body apart from, and previous to, its specific form. His teaching, that it is one 

 and the same substantial form which makes matter a definite kind of body and a 

 body, remained unaltered. 



