132 DANIEL A. CALLUS 



ciple, namely the soul, that an organic body is a body and a 

 definite kind of body, that is, an animal or human body, since 

 whatever perfection is superadded to an already constituted 

 being does not impart a specific being, but merely an acci- 

 dental being, or a mode of being. Unless we admit the patent 

 contradiction that one and the same being could belong to two 

 different species, we must agree that the soul confers on the 

 organic composite a complete substantial being, and conse- 

 quently that the soul is only one. In fact, as soon as the soul 

 departs from the body, the body is no longer an animal or 

 human body, but becomes something else, with an utterly dif- 

 ferent nature. ^^ Professor E. Gilson has correctly remarked 

 that there is complete agreement between Avicenna and Gundis- 

 salinus on the concept of the unity of the soul in a composite. ^*^ 



I have dwelt at some length on this point, for it is of no 

 mean importance in determining the exact source of the unity 

 thesis. It is true that, strictly speaking, the discussion turned 

 primarily on the unity of the soul; obviously, as we have 

 already noted, a different question from that of the unity 

 of substantial form. Nonetheless, Gundissalinus, presenting 



^^ " Nam corpus proprium, in quo existit unaquaeque animarum, scilicet tarn 

 vegetabilis quam sensibilis quam etiam rationalis, non est id quod est ex com- 

 plexione propria sed ex anima. Anima enim est quae facit illud esse illius com- 

 plexionis, nee permanet in complexione propria in actu nisi quamdiu fuerit anima 

 in illo. Anima enim sine dubio est causa per quam vegetabile et animal sunt illius 

 complexionis; ipsa enim anima est principium generationis et vegetationis. Unde 

 impossibile est ut proprium subiectum animae sit id quod est in actu nisi per 

 animam. Non enim verum est ut proprium subiectum animae prius constituatur ab 

 alio, cui postea adveniat anima quasi non habens partem in eius constitutione vel 

 definitione, sicut accidentia quae consequuntur esse rei consecutione necessaria, non 

 constituentia illud in actu. Immo ipsa anima constituit ipsum proprium subiectum 

 et dat ei esse in actu. Cum vero anima separatur ab eo, succedit necessario cum 

 separatione eius alia forma, quae est sicut opposita formae complexionali. Haec 

 enim forma et haec materia, quam habebat dum aderat anima, non remanet post 

 animam in sua specie, quoniam destruitur eius species et eius substantia quae 

 erat subiectum animae." Ibid., chap. 2, p. 41. 



" Les deux philosophes se trouvent done avoir du meme coup une conception 

 identique de I'unite de I'ame dans le compose." E. Gilson, " Les sources greco- 

 arabes de I'Augustinisme avicennisant," Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du M-A., IV 

 (1929), 84. 



