142 DANIEL A. CALLUS 



The debate opens by setting forth the evidence in support of 

 the unity view. Three arguments are brought forward: the first 

 two are drawn from the univocal predication of ' animatum ' 

 and ' substance.' 



(1) Animatum is univocally predicated of a living body, of 

 animal and of man. Now a thing is said to be animated inas- 

 much as it possesses a soul. Since, therefore, animatum, is predi- 

 cated according to the same formal notion signified by the 

 name ' animated,' similarly the soul pertains to each thing 

 possessing a soul according to the same formal notion. Conse- 

 quently, one and the same is the soul of a living body, of animal 

 and of man. 



(2) Again, ' substance ' is univocally predicated of body, of 

 living body, and of each of its inferiors; and it is specified by 

 the addition of gradual differences, such as corporeal, living, 

 sentient, and so on. Likewise the soul is specified by the addi- 

 tion of vegetative, sensitive, and rational. Now as ' substance ' 

 is a genus with respect to its species, so ' soul ' is a genus with 

 respect to its species. But it cannot be said that there are many 

 substances in one species of substance. For the same reason it 

 should not be said that there are three souls in man, but one 

 soul only. Accordingly, the vegetative, the sensitive and the 

 rational are not three souls, but one soul only. 



(3) ]\Ioreover, if these were three diverse souls, there would 

 be in reality three souls in man, which is contrary to Avicenna, 

 who teaches that in man it is from the same rational soul that 

 the vegetative life, the sensitive life and the rational life are 

 derived.*^ 



That they are diverse souls might be argued as follows: 



(1) If the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational were 

 one soul, then as the rational is incorruptible, so also the vege- 

 tative and the sensitive souls would be incorruptible; and as 



*' " Si sint diversae aiaimae, contingit hominem habere tres animas in effectu, 

 quod est contra Avicennam, qui dicit quod ab anima rationaJi est in homine 

 vegetatio, sensibilitas, rationalitas." Cambridge, St. John's College, MS 120, fol. 

 125rb. 



