ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM OF UNITY OF FORM 14& 



the rational soul can be separated from the body, enjoying per- 

 petual life, likewise the souls of a tree or of an ass would live 

 forever. 



(2) The second argument aims at proving that ' soul ' is not 

 a genus; for, since the genus contains something more than each 

 of its species, no genus is equal to its species. Consequently, the 

 vegetative, the sensitive and the rational are three distinct 

 species, not a genus. 



Blund's answer is that this word soul {hoc nomen * anima ') 

 means the genus of the vegetative, of the sensitive and of the 

 rational souls. Sensitive soul is a subaltern genus, inasmuch as 

 it is a genus with respect to the rational soul, and a species 

 of the vegetative soul. But in man there is only one single 

 soul which imparts vegetative life, sensitivity and reason.*® 



Doubtless, John Blund's treatment is still quite embryonic, 

 and the real issue is more implied than expressed. Nevertheless, 

 Blund is a definite witness, not only to the fact that the ques- 

 tion was discussed in the schools by the masters of Arts in the 

 first decade of the thirteenth century, but also to the fact that 

 its first solution was in favor of the unity thesis. Its significance 

 lies in this, that we have in this account, however inarticulate 

 it may be, some of the same arguments which were later ad- 

 vanced in the heyday of the conflict by both opponents and 

 defenders: that of the corruptibility or incorruptibility of the 

 soul was adduced by all the pluralists, whereas the supporters 

 of the unity thesis insisted that it is one and the same prin- 

 ciple that gives life, sense and reason to one individual. 



A few years later Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican 

 master in the University of Paris (1229-1230) , attests that the 

 question had reached the faculty of theology. His statement 

 bears considerable weight for its accuracy and conciseness. 



There are, he says, three species of souls: the vegetative soul, 



*^ " Solutio. Dicimus quod hoc nomen ' anima ' significat genus animae vegeta- 

 bilis et animae sensibilis et rationalis. Et in homine est una sola anima a qua est 

 vegetatio, sensus et ratio. Et anima sensibilis est genus subalternum, quia anima 

 sensibilis est genus animae rationalis et species animae vegetabilis." Ibid., fol. 

 125va. 



