ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM OF UNITY OF FORM 147 



sibili, vegetabili et raiionabili, qui dicunt esse diversas sub- 

 stantias et unain animam in corpore haminis." ^^ 



(v) With Philip the Chancellor (c. 1230) the problem en- 

 tered into its second stage of development. The discussion 

 turned, then, not on the unity or plurality of souls, but defi- 

 nitely on the unity or plurality of substances, whether the vege- 

 tative, the sensitive and the rational are one or three substances 

 in man. Theologians discussed it in their commentaries on 

 Book II, dist. 17, of the Sentences, and also in their quaestiones 

 disputatae and quodlibetales, and later in special treatises. 



(vi) The masters of Arts generally raised the question in 

 their commentaries on Aristotle's De anima, at the close of 

 Book I or at the beginning of Book II. We have an illuminating 

 clue in Adam of Buckfield (c. 1250) as to their procedure in 

 setting the question. In this passage (411 a 26-411 b 11), he 

 tells us, Aristotle deals with two questions. The first is whether 

 the attributes of the soul, namely understanding, opinion, de- 

 sire and the like, appertain to the soul as a whole, or whether 

 each particular operation is dependent on a particular part; 

 that is, whether the soul as a whole thinks, desires, perceives, 

 or whether one part thinks, another perceives, another desires. 

 The second question is this: Does life reside in one single part 

 of the soul, or in more than one, or in all parts.? According to 

 some, however, Aristotle's intention is to investigate a different 

 problem, namely whether the vegetative, the sensitive and the 

 rational are distinct with respect to their operations, or with 

 respect to a diversity of substance. Buckfield believes that 

 this interpretation is based neither on our translation {jiostram, 

 i. e., the Greek-Latin version) nor on the other {aliam, i. e., 

 from the Arabic) . Aristotle simply meant to maintain against 

 Plato that the soul is not divided into various parts which in 

 turn are located in different organs. Since, therefore, the 

 problem concerning one or more substances in man was left 

 unsolved by the Philosopher, there is room for further inquiry. 



"De anima, I, tr. II, c. 15 (ed. Borgnet, V, 184 a); III. tr. V, c. 4 (417 b ff.) 

 et alibi passim. 



