GRAVITATIONAL MOTION 209 



There are some accidents, notes Theodoric, which are purely- 

 accidental in the sense that they have no per se order to any 

 causal principle found in the subject by reason of its species, 

 nor to the per se cause of the subject (i. e., its generator) , but 

 can be present or not without affecting the nature of the 

 subject. For example, heat or cold in a stone are purely 

 accidental in this way.^° Other accidents are naturally in the 

 subject according to its species, either always or for a certain 

 time, and have a per se order to some causal principle in the 

 subject. This group of accidents is further divisible into two 

 types. Some are naturally produced by the subject itself, and 

 are found only in things which have a natural diversity of 

 parts. The organs of living animals are an example of this 

 type.^^ Another type is that of accidents produced by some 

 causal principle not itself found in the subject, but which pro- 

 duces the subject (e. g., the generator) . These accidents are 

 found per se and naturally in homogeneous things, of which an 

 example is wetness in water. Since they cannot come from any 

 intrinsic principle, but must come from an extrinsic one, and 

 this cannot be the end, they must be produced by the efficient 

 agent of the subject, which is the generator.^- The per se 

 accidents of which Theodoric is here speaking come " under the 

 essential order of the generator," and are produced by the same 

 action which terminates in the substance or nature of the 

 subject, so that they do not need any other essential mover 



^° Cap. 36, M 17va, T 184v, U 145va. 

 " Cap. 37, M 17va, T 184v, U 145va. 



52 . 



'Cap. 38, M 17vb, T 184v-185r, U 145va-b: Alia vero accidencia secundum 

 naturam que reducuntur ad aliquod principium causale, non quidem repertum in 

 subiecto, sed quod est ipsius subiecti causa factiva, puta generans. Et ista sunt 

 omnia ea accidencia que secundum naturam et per se insunt rebus homogeneis, ut 

 sunt humidum et frigidum virtuale in aqua, frigidum et siccum virtuale in terra, 

 grave et leve, et similia. Hec igitur, quia insunt per naturam et sunt per se acci- 

 dencia, necesse est ea reduci tamquam in causam aliquid eorum que sunt subiecti 

 per se et secundum naturam. Nee hoc potest esse aliquid intrinsecum, secundum 

 predictam racionem. Igitur oportet quod principium eorum sit aliquid extrinsecum, 

 quod sit per se causa subiecti. Finis autem non est principium factivum alicuius 

 rei, sed mo vet per intentionem solum. Relinquitur ergo efficiens sive generans esse 

 talium encium factivum principium. 



