238 CHARLES DEKONINCK 



in the discovery that there is no purposeful activity going on 

 in nature and that everything must be explained without 

 having any resort whatsoever to purpose; and that if there 

 appears to be purpose in nature it is only in appearance, so 

 that when you use terms that are related to purpose in beasts 

 or plants, you are using the term as a sheer metaphor. There 

 is no room for a " large " sense of purpose. 



It is not my intention to show here that nature acts for a 

 purpose. I merely want to attract your attention to the strange 

 antinomies we are led to when we deny purpose in nature. 

 I am just going to present the antinomies; my present purpose 

 does not extend beyond this. Let me then make four points 

 regarding purposeful activity and nature, in the context of 

 Huxley's assertions which I have just quoted. 



(1) Sir Julian, along with Lord Russell, is emphatic that 

 action for a purpose is clearly recognized in human making 

 and behavior. He accepts that man acts for a purpose, acts for 

 the sake of something; and this is verified in man's case unmis- 

 takably according to both these authors; they are both quite 

 critical and accept as little as possible, which is in itself a 

 praiseworthy attitude. They say, and allow us to say, that 

 man truly acts for a purpose. Far from denying such action, 

 Huxley asserts that " the future of man, if it is to be progress 

 and not merely a standstill or degeneration, must be guided 

 by a deliberate purpose. And this human purpose can only be 

 formulated in terms of the new attributes achieved by life in 

 becoming human." Purposeful activity is therefore a radically 

 new kind of reality that arises uniquely in the case of man. 

 It is not to be found in nature itself. Man himself cannot be 

 said to have been brought about for the sake of something. 

 Yet man, as we have stressed, is in many respects unique 

 among animals: a purposeful agent is brought about without 

 intent in any possible sense of this word. 



Until this purposeful agent appeared on the scene, " The 

 purpose manifested in evolution, whether in adaptation, spe- 

 cialization, or biological progress, is only an apparent purpose. 



