Darwin's dilemma 239 



It is just as much a product of blind forces as is the falling 

 of a stone to earth or the ebb and flow of the tides. It is we 

 who have read purpose into evolution, as earlier men projected 

 will and emotion into inorganic phenomena like storm or earth- 

 quake. If we wish to work towards a purpose for the future 

 of man, we must formulate that purpose ourselves. Purposes 

 in life are made, not found." 



Sir Julian offers no reason why, though at first sight the 

 biological sector seems full of purpose, the purpose manifested 

 in evolution is only an apparent purpose. He offers no reason 

 for this, but I will explain the seeming plausibility of this 

 hypothesis a bit later. 



We must concede that if there is action for a purpose in 

 irrational nature, that is, outside of man, it will be very dif- 

 ferent from the kind we find in man, to the point where 

 purpose or action for a purpose will have a different meaning 

 when said of man, when said of beast, and when said of a plant. 

 If there is that kind of action in nature, if the term purpose 

 is deserved, if it is applicable, it will have to carry a new 

 meaning, but a meaning related to and dependent upon the 

 one we first imposed. If it is stretchable, as it were, if it can 

 be enlarged, then we will have to accept that it will have a 

 different connotation in these different cases. 



This we ask of Sir Julian. Is it so obvious that a purpose 

 is either human or no pui-pose at all.'' If a purpose is indeed 

 either human or no purpose at all, then of course Sir Julian's 

 position would be quite irrefutable. He suggests that it is we 

 who read purpose into nature, that is, we project into nature 

 certain things that are actually characteristic of, and exclu- 

 sively found in man. And this is no doubt often the case. But 

 are we not being anthropomorphic, we ask, in a more sophis- 

 ticated way when we imply that nature's purpose is either 

 human or no purpose at all? Isn't that another kind of 

 anthropomorphism.'' On the other hand if organisms are built 

 by nature in " purposeful pursuits," does this mean that nature 

 must have a " conscious aim "? I mean, is purposeful action 



