270 MELVIN A. GLUTZ 



sensible things is easier than that of immaterial things, and in 

 teaching and learning, the preferable order is to start with what 

 is easier/' Thus, the order of learning is the inverse of the order 

 of nature. 



What is to be said of the via iudicii and the order of learning? 

 As a first approach we may note that St. Thomas opposes the 

 via iudicii to the via invejitionis,^" the latter of which parallels 

 the order of learning. The via inventionis is a procedure from 

 the sensible to self-evident principles and thence to the con- 

 clusions flowing from them; herein is there a true " discovery " 

 of truth. The way of judgment is the inverse of this." It con- 

 sists of resolving or analyzing a mediate truth into its principles. 

 It verifies and evaluates already acquired knowledge by tracing 

 conclusions back to self-evident premisses." Thus, in a science, 

 when there has been a chain of demonstrations one following 

 from the other, a conclusion can be resolved or analysed back 

 to first principles by retracing the course of the demonstrations 

 developed through the via inventionis. The way of judgment 

 is not then the essential order of learning or of teaching, though 

 it is secondarily involved in learning and teaching as the process 

 of verification of demonstrations. The way of judgment, how- 



" In V Meta., 1, n. 752; In De Trin., 7, 1, qu. 2, ad 3; In II A7ial. Post., 16, n. 6; 

 Summa Theol, II-II, 189, 1, ad 4. 



"De Veritate, 10, 8, ad 10; 14, 1; 15, 1; 22, 2; Summa Theol., I, 79, 8; 9; I-II, 

 57, 6; 68 4; II-II, 9, 1. 



^* " Cum autem homo per naturalem rationem assentit secundum intellectum 

 alicui veritati, dupliciter peificitur circa veritatem illam; prime quidera, quia capit 

 earn; secundo, quia de ea certum iudicium habet " (Summa Theol., II-II, 9, 1). 

 The references in the preceding note sufficiently describe the way of judgment. 



^^ The way of invention, from the point of view of content, proceeds by either 

 analysis or synthesis, these two terms being used in a variety of ways. However, 

 from the point of view of the logical process, invention is synthetic: putting together 

 of a syllogism. The way of judgment analyses or resolves a syllogism into its 

 elements in order that the intellect may give its assent to the conclusion. On 

 analysis-synthesis, cf. L.-M. Regis, "Analyse et synthese dans I'oeuvre de saint 

 Thomas," in Studia Mediaevalia in Ilonorem Admodum Rev. Raymundi Joscphi 

 Martin (Brugis Flandrorum: De Tempel) ; idem., Epistemology, pp. 422-457; S. E. 

 Dolan, " Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse," 

 Laved Theologique et Philosophique, VI (1950) , 9-62; F. X. Calcagno, Philosophia 

 Scholostica (Napoli: D'Auria, 1950), I, pp. 216-219. 



