MOTIONLESS MOTION 285 



The Renaissance proved itself in very truth a new birth, in that 

 it not only revived the various philosophical theories of antiquity 

 but also recovered the spirit by which they had been created. The 

 first centuries of the Renaissance were content in general to tie up 

 with some doctrine or other. But so long as they sought to establish 

 anew the Platonic, the Aristotelian, the Stoic, the Epicurean, and 

 the Skeptic systems, all these remained mere heirlooms of which 

 it was impossible to take complete possession. Descartes, precisely 

 because of his unhistorical temper, was the first to succeed in the 

 historic act of liberation. For he never merely took over conclu- 

 sions but reembodied in himself the original power of philosophical 

 thinking. He filled all science with this power and he thereby 

 discovered a new universal form of science, and the Cartesian 

 method and the Cartesian system are but the discovery of science 

 and establishment of this new form.^ 



That this new approach to science will result in a new "on- 

 tology " is shown by his appreciation of the Greek synthesis in 

 the very beginning of this work where he says: 



The more deeply reason is absorbed in its own being, and the more 

 conscious it becomes of its own true worth, the further it penetrates 

 into the Being of things. For there is no sharp line that separates 

 truth from reality, thought from Being. This fundamental meaning 

 of Greek philosophy is fully realized in Plato. With him the 

 problem of being and the problem of knowledge, ' ontology ' and 

 ' logic ', are bound together in indissoluble unity. 



That this analysis of the Greek achievement has some basis 

 in fact would be generally admitted. However, in order to see 

 its lacunae more precisely, some further comparison with the 

 Aristotelian " synthesis " will be necessary. We might begin 

 with the problem of being or " ontology." 



Aristotle studied being in the science which is today often 

 referred to as " metaphysics." He called this " first philosophy," 

 " theology," and sometimes " the divine science." In his con- 

 ception of this discipline there were at least two very important 

 aspects: it is a science, and the knowledge of it is in some way 

 above the capacity of the human intellect. When he referred 

 to it as a science he was speaking in terms of the ideas estab- 



^ Ibid., p. 13. 



