296 SISTER M. JOCELYN 



would exist or not is a question that may fairly be asked, for 

 if there cannot be someone to count, there cannot be anything 

 that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot be number; 

 for number is either what has been or what can be counted." ^ 



Would we, following the Aristotelian doctrine find ourselves 

 forced to hold that prior to the creation of man (or at least 

 of a higher animal with memory and hence a knowledge of 

 time) there was no time and all things were instantaneous? 

 We are cautioned against drawing too hasty a conclusion how- 

 ever by these words of Aristotle: "... it is evident that every 

 change and everything that moves is in time." * Certainly prior 

 to the creation of man things changed and moved, so in Aris- 

 totle's own words they were " in time." Such a conclusion 

 however seems to contradict his position that if there were no 

 soul there would be no time. 



There is some doubt however that this is truly Aristotle's 

 position. The above translation is based on a text of William 

 of Moerbeke. Aristotle's own text is an uncertain guide because 

 it is in such poor condition and because the critical study of it 

 is rendered uncertain in that the introduction of a period or a 

 comma, missing in the text, would change the meaning. After 

 a brief survey of the history of the problem it will be the pur- 

 pose of this paper to show that it is more in keeping with the 

 thought of Aristotle to hold that time is formally a being of 

 nature and not of reason. True, the greater number of phi- 

 losophers think that time would not be if there were no soul. 

 We shall try to show that it is the thought of Aristotle and of 

 St. Thomas that time is an ens naturae and not an ens rationis, 

 and to exist even if there were no soul; not indeed perfect in 

 being, but rather imperfect, as in motion. 



An investigation of the history of the question shows that 

 without doubt Plato believed time to be real: 



Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow 

 this attribute in its fulness upon a creature was impossible. Where- 



' Ibid., IV, c. 14, 223a21-25. 

 * Ibid., IV, c. 14, 223a-14-15. 



