334 RAYMOND J. NOGAR 



formal patterns, but rather to the discovery of new patterns of 

 explanation.^^ 



This ambiguity which has entered into the language of 

 science by the operational methods of micro-physics has not 

 completely modified the usage of the term " fact " on the level 

 of the macro- and the megalo-sciences. There are many scien- 

 tific disciplines which still give the term " fact " the meaning 

 of something known to have actual existence, something either 

 observably or inferentially known to be certain. But the tech- 

 niques, terminology and methods of physics have set the pace 

 for theoretical scientific thinking for the past three centuries, 

 and biologists, chemists, phychologists, anthropologists, soci- 

 ologists and even historians have not remained unaffected by 

 this change in the fundamental meanings of the basic concepts 

 of physics. For our purposes here, it suffices merely to mention 

 this increasing tendency for technical scientific language to 

 depart from the common dictionary acceptation of such terms 

 as " fact " and " observation." 



The Facts of Prehistory 



Returning to the issue of the " fact of evolution," we are 

 confronted with another problem. If we accept, for purposes of 

 discussion, the definition of evolution set down by the panelists 

 at the Darwin Centennial Convention (quoted above) , we find 

 ourselves involved in a question which is essentially an his- 

 torical one, or, more properly, a problem of prehistory. As T. 

 Huxley wrote in 1907: 



Primary and direct evidence in favour of evolution can be furnished 

 only by paleontology ... If evolution has taken place, there will 

 be its mark left; if evolution has not taken place, there will lie its 

 refutation.'" 



Huxley was speaking of organic evolution, but the problems of 



^^ N. R. Hanson, op. cit., pp. 1-2. 



"" Address on " The Coming of Age of The Origin of Species," in Darwiniana 

 (London, 1907), p. 239. 



