FACT OF EVOLUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTIONISM 335 



the origin of life, of the elements, of the earth, the stars, the 

 nebulae, etc. are, a jortiori, problems of prehistory. Conse- 

 quently, the evidence and inferences brought forward in sup- 

 port of these " facts " unwitnessed by human eyes will be 

 the kind proper to the disciplines which study historical process. 

 Not that the neo-sciences (e. g. neo-biology) cannot offer but- 

 tressing arguments for some of the prehistorical inferences, but 

 the kind of evidence and inference which constitute the prin- 

 cipal argument of evolutionary process is determined and 

 limited by the very nature of the problem of prehistory. 



In matters concerning the sciences of prehistory (paleon- 

 tology, archaeology, etc.) , two extremes must be avoided: (1) 

 expecting more from the kind of evidence and inference than is 

 reasonable, and (2) attributing greater stability and reliability 

 to the evidence and inferences than is reasonable. In order to 

 avoid these excesses, it is necessary to assess properly what kind 

 of problem the prehistorian poses, and the power and limits of 

 his methodology in seeking solutions. The sciences of pre- 

 history are similar to written history in one way, but quite 

 dissimilar in another. Perhaps we can best understand the 

 problem of discovering " facts " and making " inferences " in 

 prehistory by comparing its methods to those of the profes- 

 sional historian. 



Scientific history differs from other sciences and arts in its 

 subject-matter, its facts, its primary aim, its language, its 

 theories and interpretations, its methods and its meaning.-^ Its 

 subject-matter is the recorded past, more or less dramatized 

 or put into order. The recorded past is a series of indi\ddual 

 events, actions, persons, non-recurring for the most part, seen 

 in the context of a space- time continuum. The facts are indi- 

 vidual, concrete, unrepeatable events made available by the 

 witnesses who recorded them. The primary aim of history is to 

 reconstruct the events in their individuality, thus resembling a 

 literary narrative rather than a scientific treatise. The lan- 



"^ Cf. The Philosophy of History in our Time, ed. by H. Meyerhoff (New York, 

 1959) pp. 18-22. 



