428 MICHAEL E. STOCK 



basic law of subjective morality; whoever departs from this 

 law sins. It follows then, that if a man never departs from 

 the judgment of his conscience, he does not sin. Even if his 

 norms are wrong through no fault of his own, he is guiltless 

 if he follows his conscience; but he is guilty if he departs from 

 it, even if by chance what he chooses to do be objectively 

 right. If a man's norms of conduct are objectively right, and 

 he always follows them, he not only does not sin, but he also 

 makes no mistakes. If his norms are objectively wrong, he 

 will not sin in following them, but he may make great mistakes 

 and tragic ones. He would belong to the ranks of those who 

 mean well but blunder. From this point of view it is of evident 

 moment to know how objectively true norms of conscience are 

 discovered, or, as moralist say, how to form a ' right conscience.' 



(2) The norms of conscience. 



We have said above that the act of conscience is a judgment 

 of reason passed on concrete actions; the norms of conscience 

 are the standards discovered and formulated by man's reason, 

 by which he can distinguish right from wrong. Reason in short 

 sets up the rules by which it judges. 

 According to St. Thomas, it is within the power of man's 

 reason to discover, at least in broad outline, the rules by which 

 he ought to live. The power of reason bears upon not merely 

 the superficial appearances of things, but their meaning or 

 significance, the essential characteristics of things and the essen- 

 tial relations of things to each other, not equally well in all 

 men nor perfectly in any man, but as always tending to a 

 deeper, clearer and fuller understanding of the nature of things. 

 The knowledge of the essences of things is not a formalistic 

 knowledge, like a diagram of a basic structure, for to know 

 things essentially not only must their nature be grasped but 

 also their strivings, their natural potentialities and their natural 

 appetites to fulfillment, and the ends or purposes which do in 

 fact fulfill them. Moreover, in discovering the moral order, the 

 power of reason must also work reflexively; man must be con- 



