CONSCIENCE AND SUPEREGO 429 



scious of himself, and of what he is and of what he needs and 

 wants, reahzing his potentiaUties and the things that fulfill 

 them and the power he has over the means of attaining these 

 things in which knowledge he is not only led by his own appe- 

 tites, both animal and rational, but also by the pleasures and 

 satisfactions that one action or another in fact obtains for him. 

 This knowledge of himself and of the world around him cannot 

 remain merely scientific and abstract. To live and to live 

 rightly it must be applied to the concrete situation in which 

 he finds himself, and to the person he actually is; for this he 

 must be able to read signs and apply his knowledge to the case 

 at hand. At the heart of all this conscious activity, ruling and 

 informing all his conduct is the basic insight that he is respon- 

 sible to some degree for his actions and his life, and accountable 

 to greater or lesser extent for good and evil. 



The fact of experience is that men know this, and by this 

 power of reason, do grasp and understand the purposes and 

 ways of life, and formulate what they have understood into 

 intelligent rules by which they guide themselves. Reason so 

 informed and instructed in the matter of conduct is the norm 

 of conscience. ^^ 



^^ In making reason the essential agent in the formulation of the norms of con- 

 science, there is a real danger of hyper-intellectual ism. For our present purposes, it 

 is necessary to underline the rational function, but the profound influence of other 

 psychological factors must not be overlooked. In formulating their standards of 

 conduct, men are deeply influenced by their ' feelings,' by the impulses, appetites, 

 desires, urges, etc. which move them to action; what ' feels ' right is often taken to 

 be right. And this is not a wholly false principle for moral guidance; essentially 

 man's appetites move him towards what is good for him. This is especially true if 

 sufficient weight is given to his rational appetites, his appetites for truth and 

 certainty, for justice and peace with others and for himself, for human community, 

 etc. 



Moreover, since appetite is not a force simply extraneous to reason, but more a 

 co-principle of action, appetite is naturally apt to be moved by reason, and can in 

 fact become impregnated with the force of reason; in St. Thomas' words, it can 

 participate in reason. Men are psychologically plastic, subject to being molded by 

 their own activities. If then a man habitually follows reason, his api>etites become 

 reasonably formed, prone to what is reasonable, and in this way the appetitive 



