430 MICHAEL E. STOCK 



(3) St. Thomas on natural law. 



All men concur in the broadest outlines of the norms of 

 conscience; in St. Thomas' words: all men know the primary 

 principles of the natural law. That his life is good, that he 

 must have food, drink, clothing and shelter to preserve it 

 comfortably, that he must grow and mature in mind and body 

 are laws of life evident to all men. How he might accomplish 

 these ends may differ widely from man to man and nation to 

 nation, but that they must be accomplished is accepted by all. 

 That he needs a wife and family, companionship and society, 

 and the life of the community, is also evident — " the solitary 

 man is either a beast or a god " — and that he needs whatever 

 is necessary to preserve peace, justice and cooperation in the 

 community is equally evident. That knowledge and the arts, 

 and the power these afford are good; all men know these things 

 in a general way as the laws of their nature. These are the 

 things that make for happiness, and all men desire happiness, 

 at least enough to make the privations of life worthwhile. 

 All these things can be understood by the native power of 

 reason interpreting and formulating all human needs of mind 

 or body in terms of what men ought to do. Ultimately all men 

 would like perfect and flawless happiness, to know whence 



force and the whole man become reasonable, i. e. virtuous. Then since reason tends 

 to follow appetite, appetite which is reasonable tends to conform to right reason. 



However, it is also obvious from all experience that appetite can guide man 

 falsely, urging what is in fact wrong. In essence, the urging of appetite is never 

 wrong; it is only moved by its proper object, and it is right that it be so moved. 

 The wrongness of an appetitive movement arises because some circumstance of 

 time or place or opportunity is lacking, or because the degree is too great or too 

 little, or for some other reason to which appetite itself is blind. It is the work of 

 reason to weigh all the conditions of an action, and judge its suitability in the 

 whole context; hence it is sometimes the work of reason to resist or postpone the 

 satisfaction of an appetite. And if reason consistently fails in this work, appetite 

 may develop into a hindrance to right reason. 



In discussing the formation of norms of morality, these, and indeed many other, 

 considerations would have to be taken into account. It is not the place here for 

 that discussion, but it should at least be noted that there is more to morality than 

 syllogizing, and with that in mind, we can safely enlarge on the role of reason in 

 making moral standards. 



