CONSCIENCE AND SUPEREGO 433 



are planted early, even before they can be fully understood, 

 but by their nature they invite understanding, and ideally, 

 this understanding is eventually achieved. For Freud, the 

 norms of conscience have no particular reference to reason, are 

 accepted without judgment by the child, and becoming uncon- 

 scious are hardly ever afterwards susceptible to critical evalua- 

 tion. Throughout life man carries with him his basically 

 infantile standards of right and wrong, as a static precipitate 

 in the mind from the resolved Oedipus complex.^* 



Another consequence of Freud's interpretation is that the 

 superego tends to be a wholly repressive function. It is not 

 necessarily so, but tends to be, for it is only by chance that an 

 instinctual impulse will escape the censor of the superego. Since 

 the superego is formed on a non-reasoned and non-purposive 

 basis, it haphazardly may or may not be a good agency for 

 guiding instinctual activities into profitable channels. (As a 

 result, the happiest people are those who grow up in the least 

 developed society; neurosis is a characteristic of civilization.) 

 For St. Thomas, since reason is ideally the ultimate guide of 

 standards of conduct, it will always tend to profit human 



activity, we can find manifestations of the rational mind at a surprisingly early age, 

 much earlier than the age of five. We do not expect, at that age, to find intelligence 

 well developed and capable of sustained reasoning, but we can find definite signs of 

 intelligent perceptions. At the age of seven months, the average child can imitate 

 simple syllables, respond to and imitate gestures, heed a simple prohibition. At 

 fifteen months language is beginning, at two years he can himself use language, and 

 understand a surprising amount of what is said to him — clear signs of properly 

 human intelligence. He can cooperate at feedmg and dressing himself, enjoy being 

 the center of attention, understand a variety of verbal commands, and make up his 

 mind whether or not he will obey. At the age of three, he is well in control of 

 language, at the age of four his imagination has become inventive, his sense of 

 independence marked, (although not too genuine; it is conditioned on his basic 

 dependence) . At four and a half, he can reason, likes long discussions, shows a sur- 

 prising wealth of material and experience to draw on, and seems to be prompted 

 by an intellectual, philosophizing sort of interest. At five, he likes to be taught, 

 and wants to be good. (See Child Behavior, Eg and Ames, Chapter 2.) Certainly 

 the roots of rational morality can be planted at this age. 



** Some of the post-Freudians have modified this severe position, making the 

 superergo a more pliable and reasonable mental structure, as has been noted above, 

 but Freud himself held largely to his original formulation. 



