484 BENEDICT M. ASHLEY 



cant that the Greeks developed considerable historical and 

 sociological research which if it had been carried on would have 

 closed the gap. In medieval and Renaissance times the tran- 

 sitional social situation led moral casuists to initiate similar 

 researches. 



Once we have grasped the special character of the social 

 sciences, their relation to metaphysics and theology also be- 

 comes clearer, A sound metaphysics recognizes about itself 

 that although it may serve to clarify the nature of social science 

 and some of its basic concepts, such as that of value, it can 

 never replace the study of concrete social institutions carried 

 on by social science. Metaphysical methods are not adequate 

 for the study of the concrete, and it was precisely the error of 

 the Hegelians and of Marx to make this illegitimate leap from 

 metaphysics to history. 



Theology, on the other hand, does concern itself with the 

 same problems as the social sciences even down to the histori- 

 cal particular, but it views them from a wholly different per- 

 spective. The theologian accepts from social science all its 

 established conclusions and uses them as tools in his own ex- 

 ploration of reality, with the conviction that well-established 

 scientific truth will be entirely compatible with supernatural 

 truth. On the other hand both in social science and in theology 

 there are many views which are only probable and provisional. 

 As regards these the sociologist and the theologian can engage 

 in fruitful discussion, each casting light on the phenomena from 

 his own point-of-view. This discussion stimulates research in 

 both fields, and the expert in either field is not obliged to 



tween Philosophers and Sociologists," American Catholic Sociological Review, XIX 

 (1958) , 290-309 and Herbert Johnston, " The Social and Moral Sciences," in Ward, 

 op. cit., pp. 452-463 are parallel to the attempts to distinguish the philosophy of 

 nature from modern natural science. The earlier writers tried to make the distinc- 

 tion in terms of " ultimate " and " secondary causes." More recently it is in terms 

 of " philosophical " and " empiriological " or " constructural " modes of knowing. 

 But neither of these criteria can form the basis for an essential division of the 

 sciences. Only metaphysics deals with ultimate causes, and every science employs 

 both "philosophical" i.e., demonstrative knowledge and constructural or empirio- 

 logical knowledge. 



