WORLD CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY 29 



with high premiums for work done in excess of given quotas. The ration- 

 ing of food, clothing, housing, etc., is used also to provide incentives. High 

 honors are awarded to workers of exceptional accomplishment. 



In the Academy of Sciences one also sees the working of the incentive 

 system. It is a great honor to be an Academician, and with the position 

 there goes a salary and often the use of automobiles, etc. The science pro- 

 gram is not planned by political leaders but is turned over to the Academy, 

 whose members are elected by secret ballot, and the Academy is presum- 

 ably held responsible for the success of the program. 



During the war the Russians apparently carried on only a rather small 

 scale program in nuclear physics. For example, Professor Jofife in Lenin- 

 grad started building a cyclotron before the war but work on this was 

 stopped until this year. I was told that this forty-ton cyclotron is to be 

 completed in December 1945. I believe, however, that now the Russians 

 have already started a large atomic program and that they will carry this 

 out with great skill and ability. We must remember also that in this work 

 they can get great help from German scientists, trained engineers, and 

 technicians. 



The rate at which such a program will progress depends largely upon 

 the motivation. Prestige will play a large role. The Russians are proud of 

 their accomplishments during the war and they believe that their success 

 is due to their system of government. The urge to have their own program 

 of atomic energy will be irresistible. 



THE EFFECTS OF INSECURITY 



Their present feeling of insecurity, which results I believe from our 

 unfortunate handling of the atomic bomb situation, must be a still more 

 powerful incentive. 



The Russians realized better than any other nation the state of in- 

 security in Europe after 1934. At last in May 1945 the war against the 

 aggressors was won and security was attained. All the Russians with 

 whom I came in contact in June expected a long era of peace in which 

 the damage done by the Germans in the devastated areas could be repaired 

 and simultaneously the standard of living could be raised ultimately to 

 a level as high or higher than that in America. Within less than two months 

 the atomic bombs were dropped in Japan. 



To understand the effect on the Russians let us consider what American 

 public opinion would now be if we had no atomic bomb project, but, near 

 the end of the war in Europe, atomic bombs had been dropped on Berlin 

 by the Russians without warning. Would our insecurity have been entirely 

 relieved if the Soviet Government a few months later had announced that 

 it held an increasing stock pile of atomic bombs as a "sacred trust" ? 



