Part One: Harnessing Science 



CHAPTER I 



THE BEGINNINGS 



T„ 



,HAT PHASE of the European war which many Americans 

 were complacently dubbing the "phony war" ended suddenly on May lo, 

 1940, when the Germans struck at France through Belgium and the 

 Netherlands. The speed of the German advance came as a great surprise 

 to many who had placed their faith in the Maginot Line and its northward 

 extension. The dramatic character of unfolding events lent sharp point to 

 the concern of a group of American scientists who realized the extent to 

 which the United States was unprepared to fight a modern war. 



Historians may differ as to the reasons why with all of its remarkable sci- 

 entific advances the United States lagged so dangerously in the development 

 of weapons, but none will deny the fact. During the two decades between 

 the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II, the people 

 of the United States had pinned their faith on the impossibility of another 

 world war, although their government had not been willing to bear any 

 share of the responsibility for the success of the one international organiza- 

 tion which had the slightest chance of making aggression unlikely. Appro- 

 priations for military purposes were relatively small as the American people 

 nurtured the fond hope that by its action the United States could set an 

 example of small armaments which would be followed by the rest of the 

 world. 



Yet small appropriations are by no means the key to America's scientific 

 unpreparedness for war; for during at least the last decade of that period. 

 Congress appropriated every cent requested for military research and devel- 

 opment. Perhaps the armed services were so blind to the possibilities that 

 they did not ask for adequate funds for research and development, or 

 perhaps the Bureau of the Budget cut the requests for funds for this pur- 

 pose; in any event, the initial responsibility for low appropriations for 

 research and development resides in the executive branch and not in the 

 legislative. 



Whether the armed services would have made any better preparation 

 for modern war had they had more money is another subject for fruitless 

 speculation. They certainly had showed limited imagination in opening 



