NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE 2Q 



Compartmentalization of information had as its purpose the restriction 

 of the amount of damage which could be caused if any individual became 

 indiscreet. In view of the fact that there were apparendy no serious indis- 

 cretions of NDRC or OSRD personnel resulting in the unauthorized dis- 

 closure of information, it appears in retrospect that compartmentaHzation 

 of information to the extent practiced was not in fact needed. It is highly 

 probable, however, that the existence of compartmentalization made the 

 armed services more willing to entrust their classified information to the 

 NDRC during the early period when the ability of the organization to 

 keep secrets had not yet been demonstrated. 



Another aspect of the security problem related to the handling of classi- 

 fied information within NDRC. At its first meeting the Committee in- 

 structed the Secretary to review the Army and Navy regulations regard- 

 ing secret, confidential and restricted matters and to submit a draft of a 

 resolution on the subject for the consideration of the Committee. Such a 

 resolution was adopted at the second meeting on August 29, 1940. It pro- 

 vided (i) that any matter of such nature that special precautions should 

 be taken to insure that information concerning it should be permanendy 

 or temporarily limited in circulation should be classified as secret, confiden- 

 tial or restricted; (2) that matter originating with the Army or the Navy 

 should be placed in the classificadon suggested by the originating depart- 

 ment and handled in accordance with the procedure established by that 

 department for matter of its class except as indicated below; (3) that mat- 

 ter originating outside the Army and Navy should be classified by the 

 Secretary after consultation with the Army and the Navy; (4) that when 

 classification was applied by the Committee, the Army and Navy rules as 

 to handling procedure should apply, and in case of conflict between those 

 rules the more stringent should be used; (5) that material originating with 

 a section or division might be tentatively classified by the originadng unit 

 which should transmit it to the Secretary for permanent classification; 



(6) that the Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of the division 

 or section handling the particular matter, should be responsible for deter- 

 mining the individuals entitled to receive classified information; and 



(7) that copies of the applicable Army or Navy reguladons regarding 

 classified matter should be furnished to each person authorized to receive 

 classified information. 



A further aspect of the security problem had to do with the acceptability 

 of particular individuals to the armed services from the standpoint of their 

 loyalty and discretion. This rapidly became one of the principal headaches 

 of NDRC and was the source of irritation and delay throughout the history 

 of NDRC and OSRD. The problem was loosely defined as one of "clear- 

 ance," a term which had different meanings at different times. The prob- 

 lem, which became particularly acute in connection with personnel of 



