^0 ORGANIZING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH FOR WAR 



a view to securing for times of peace the benefit of the experience gained 

 by OSRD in its operations for war. The questions and their answers as 

 embodied in the report entided Science - the Endless Frontier are con- 



sidered in a later chapter. 



In addition to these specific assignments, Bush acted as an informal scien- 

 tific adviser to President Roosevelt. He had access to the President and 

 operated at all times with the assurance of the President's support. 



As the liquidation of OSRD progressed in 1946, it became apparent that 

 a great gap would be left with respect to one of its most important indirect 

 benefits, namely, that of effecting a general co-ordination of Army and 

 Navy research through the common interest in OSRD projects and the 

 exchange of information with regard to them. The JNW might have been 

 expected to effect the necessary co-ordinadon but its actual operations in 

 this connection, particularly in the postwar period, were ineffective. Bush 

 was outspoken in clarifying this situation, pointing out that the committee 

 as consututed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff was weak in that it lacked 

 the direct authority to establish policies or to resolve differences betv^een the 

 Services. A basic weakness was the requirement of unanimity for decisions 

 of JCS committees and the necessity for referring to the Chiefs themselves 

 all matters upon which a dissent was made. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs 

 diemselves could act only by unanimous action. This meant that differences 

 could not be setded short of the President. 



To meet these difficukies, the Joint Research and Development Board 

 was established on June 6, 1946, by acdon of the Secretaries of War and 

 Navy This Board of five members was given a direct grant of authority 

 within its field by the two Secretaries and was so constituted as to rule by 

 majority vote. It was specifically granted final authority to make allocation 

 of responsibility for research and development programs between the Army 

 and Navy. In addition, the Board was charged with the responsibility tor 

 mving advice and recommendations on the broad problems of scope and 

 emphasis of Army and Navy research and development. Perhaps its most 

 important function was to consider the implications of strategic planning 

 upon research and development, and vice versa. One of the first actions of 

 the Board was to organize a Policy Council on which the top Army and 

 Navy planners would confer with those responsible for research and devel- 

 opment policy. Under the auspices of this Council, the opportunity existed 

 for scientists to pardcipate in military planning and strategic thinking at 

 the highest level. Bush accepted the chairmanship of JRDB, which pro- 

 ceeded prompdy to organize a series of committees and panels to cover the 

 broad field under its jurisdicdon. 



It was the genius of OSRD that Bush left it flexible, moulding the organ- 

 ization to meet the requirements of the situadon and the personalities with 



