74 ORGANIZING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH FOR WAR 



sion because of competition with other programs in that division, or be- 

 cause of the failure of a Section Chief or responsible section member to 

 pursue it with sufficient vigor. With the staff aides keeping him well 

 posted on the status of the various programs, Moreland was able by discus- 

 sions (sometimes vigorous) with the Division Chiefs to dislodge programs 

 which had been delayed. He was continually on the alert for ways to 

 speed programs entrusted to the divisions. 



Moreland also made a great contribution in the relations with the Serv- 

 ices carried on through his Office. He participated in interminable con- 

 ferences with officers of all ranks in both Services. He injected realism 

 into the formulation of Service requests and was a vigorous advocate of 

 the NDRC position with reference to the proper relations between the 

 Services and the Committee. On the one hand he stimulated the Services 

 to submit problems to NDRC and to make provision for adequate testing 

 and use of the results of NDRC research, while on the other he stimulated 

 the proper handling of those requests within the divisions. 



The position of the Chairman's Office was one in which tact combined 

 at the proper times with a certain amount of vigor accomplished what au- 

 thority and discipline could not have done. The opinions of Conant and 

 Moreland carried weight because of their authors rather than because of 

 any authority which they were in a position to or desired to exercise. The 

 formal records of the Office and the administrative devices told in the 

 preceding paragraphs fall far short of presenting a complete picture of 

 what in fact was a substantial problem in human relations. 



The Engineering and Transition Office 



In November 1941 the length of time which it took to put into use 

 the new and improved military devices emerging from the laboratories 

 prompted Bush to become interested in some aspects of production, particu- 

 larly that of small quantities of what might be termed "custom made" ap- 

 paratus. Some equipment of this type (certain radar is an example) was 

 termed by Conant to be "catalytic," because in small quantities it might 

 produce a major military or naval effect. 



Shordy before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Elihu Root, Jr., at Bush's 

 request formulated a plan for an organization headed by a special repre- 

 sentative of the Director to be charged with responsibility for stimulating 

 contracts by the Army and Navy for the production of devices which were 

 ready to come from the laboratory. The group appointed in December 1941 

 pursuant to this recommendation and headed by F. S. Gordon (Vice- 

 President, United States Pipe and Foundry Co.) as Special Assistant to 

 the Director, was known colloquially as "few-quick." It was intended that 

 it would suggest to the appropriate officers of the armed services immediate 



