PRIORITIES AND PROPERTY 233 



One point always stressed was that only small amounts were needed 

 for research and the diversion would be relatively negligible. This was gen- 

 erally well received but it had a hollow sound on those occasions when 

 a research program demanded a high proportion of the units of an item 

 in very short supply. It was the practice to enlist the aid of Army and Navy 

 officers familiar with particular projects; they helped to establish the impor- 

 tance of the research projects but they were not in a position to judge 

 the relative value of those projects and the specific Service production 

 contracts with which they might conflict. 



A conspicuous example of the secrecy problem was the case of priorities 

 for the development of the atomic bomb. The research and development 

 program grew to substantial proportions under OSRD with requirements 

 for large quantities of critical items; but the subject matter could never be 

 mentioned and it became increasingly difficult to get necessary action from 

 WPB. The OSRD priority section breathed a sigh of relief when the 

 project was transferred to the Manhattan District where it was given an over- 

 riding priority. 



The Army, Navy, Lend-Lease, OSRD, and other war agencies were very 

 often put in a preferred status as regards compliance with various limita- 

 tion, conservation and other restrictive orders issued by WPB and OPA. 

 As OSRD purchased litde equipment direcdy, it contended that the purpose 

 of the preferred status could be achieved only by the extension of the pref- 

 erence to its contractors. The interpretation of the orders varied, but it was 

 only in exceptional cases that OSRD contractors were able to take advan- 

 tage of the favored status of OSRD. 



One of the basic theories of WPB in controlling materials was that each 

 production contract should carry a project priority rating dependent upon 

 a determination of its relative importance in the procurement picture. Un- 

 der this system producers were allowed to use a project rating only to get 

 the materials which would go into the "end item," viz., the bombs or radios 

 or planes. As applied to the activities of OSRD, this principle sometimes 

 led to absurd results, as in the case of a research contract calling for the 

 delivery of a report. Under a strict interpretation of the theory, the project 

 rating in such a case would cover only the paper on which the report was 

 written. Other contracts called for the delivery of a model but even here 

 a literal interpretation of the end item theory would not cover any of the 

 material used in the basic research or in the breadboard or intermediate 

 models. Obviously research could not live under such a system. 



Fortunately OSRD was successful in maintaining throughout the war 

 that the end item was research and development and the priority rating 

 assigned covered all materials, supplies and equipment needed to carry on 

 the research and development. As plans for controlling materials changed 

 and personnel were transferred in the WPB and the Army and Navy 



