SECURITY 249 



the individuals who were the subjects of the reports. Subsequent to that 

 time the investigative agency submitted to OSRD the information developed 

 in the course of the investigation and the decision as to its bearing upon 

 the release of classified information was made by OSRD. In making its 

 decision, OSRD kept constantly in mind that decisions on its part which 

 would release classified information to persons who might make improper 

 use of it, would inevitably make the Services unwilling to release to OSRD 

 information essential to its operations. The situation was complicated by 

 the fact that the investigative agencies, to protect the sources of their infor- 

 mation, stipulated that OSRD might not involve the agencies or reveal the 

 fact that the information upon which OSRD action was based came through 

 a particular agency. 



In line with the theory that the contractor was responsible for the security 

 of its operations, OSRD never discussed investigations with the individuals 

 concerned. If OSRD had informed one man that he was "cleared" for classi- 

 fied work on OSRD contracts, it could hardly have avoided discussions with 

 other persons as to whether they also were cleared. Instead, until July 1945, 

 OSRD notified the contractor who had submitted a man's name that it 

 did not object to his employment in cases where the investigation had re- 

 vealed no reason for objection. The form was intended to make it clear 

 that OSRD was not relieving the contractor of his primary responsibility 

 for the security of his operations. As it became clear that some contractors 

 were apparently regarding this OSRD notice as superseding their responsi- 

 bility, the OSRD policy was changed and the contractors were informed in 

 July 1945, that in the future the "no objection" notices would no longer be 

 sent out by OSRD. 



A review of the procedures with respect to personnel security shows that 

 OSRD might well have been more explicit. A large part of the OSRD work 

 was done by academic institutions which had never had occasion to give 

 any thought to the handling of classified information or to precautions 

 against espionage. Obviously they had no easy way to detect individuals 

 who might engage in espionage, although for the most part they might be 

 expected to know those of questionable discretion or with loose tongues. 

 They had no way of knowing the extent or thoroughness of any investi- 

 gation which might follow their submission of personnel questionnaires to 

 OSRD and might well assume that the indication of "no objection" was 

 complete assurance of both integrity and discretion. The length of time 

 required for a report might in itself be taken as an indication of the thor- 

 oughness of the investigation rather than for what it was — an index of 

 the overloading of the investigative agencies. On the other hand, OSRD 

 recognized that in some cases the contractor could develop at least as much 

 information by brief but intensive investigation on the site as was to be 

 found in the reports reaching OSRD from the investigative agency. 



