SECURITY 



253 



Plant Security 



In the case of academic institutions, OSRD proceeded upon the assump- 

 tion that there was no occasion for a check on the loyalty or integrity of the 

 institution itself although the personnel were subjected to the same check 

 as others. A separate check was made in the case of other OSRD contractors 

 and subcontractors; approximately 2600 organizations were checked for 

 such points as subversive or other disloyal activities, violations of law, faulty 

 performance of Government contracts, and fraud against the Government. 

 The check was not as thorough as that normally made of individuals but 

 was thought to be adequate to bring to light any glaring reasons which 

 would preclude the awarding of a classified contract. The individuals within 

 the company to whom classified information was to be released were also 

 subject to the security check which normally preceded the release of such 

 information. 



The number of OSRD contractors and the even greater number of plants 

 and laboratories where they performed their work made it impossible to 

 arrange for physical inspections of all plants and laboratories. In most cases, 

 the contractors themselves determined their security requirements by refer- 

 ence to the security material furnished them by OSRD or by the War and 

 Navy Departments. 



For contractors performing a considerable portion of the total national 

 effort in important fields of research and for contractors participating in 

 research fields which were recognized by common agreement among the 

 federal research agencies involved as requiring special security, the War 

 Department provided an inspection service. Twenty-five contractors were so 

 inspected on the basis of their work for OSRD, while other OSRD con- 

 tractors were inspected on the basis of other war work. The inspections 

 made by the War Department were to determine whether the plant security 

 system employed was necessary and adequate, whether the work was such 

 that intraplant controls of movements were necessary, what areas needed 

 special protection, and what other security measures were necessary to pre- 

 vent unauthorized access to classified information from within as well as 

 from outside the plant. 



These inspections were made for advisory purposes only, and, with the 

 exception of measures which the contractor would be expected to take with- 

 out consideration of his wartime classified research, all recommendations 

 were made to OSRD and not the contractor. It was the responsibility of 

 OSRD to review the recommendations and to effect compliance with those 

 it believed warranted. 



For its own offices, OSRD adopted a system of photographic badges simi- 

 lar to those used by the Army and Navy. Guard service on the buildings in 



