DEMOBILIZATION OF OSRD 3OI 



1. Work which could not come to fruition in time to influence the 

 course of the present war should be transferred to the Services, if they felt 

 it was of sufficient importance to continue into the peace and if they were 

 willing to continue it either in their own laboratories or by arrangements 

 with permanent organizations; otherwise, it should be placed on a schedule 

 of termination which would allow for final reports and the preservation 

 of values already attained. 



2. Active jobs on the final engineering of equipment about to move into 

 service should be completed by the groups now doing the work. Any new 

 work of this nature should be initiated by the Services themselves on their 

 own contracts rather than by OSRD. 



3. Work in OSRD central laboratories, such as those for microwave 

 radar and countermeasures, should be transferred to the Services early in 

 order that they might continue it during the war and make plans for the. 

 continuance of such parts as might be needed in time of peace. 



Bush presented the above program to President Roosevelt in his report 

 of August 28, 1944. By a note of September 29, the President indicated that 

 he felt that Bush was on the right track and stated that he was referring 

 the termination program to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the 

 Navy personally. 



In the meantime Bush had sent a memorandum dated September 13, 1944, 

 to the technical personnel of OSRD dealing with plans for the demobiliza- 

 tion of OSRD. That memorandum emphasized that as long as the war 

 with Germany lasted OSRD should proceed at full speed. He stressed that 

 the memorandum was designed to initiate the preparation of a plan for 

 demobilization, but that the plan was not to be put into effect until a 

 specific day which he would set following the surrender or collapse of 

 Germany. Planning and action on transfer and termination of certain 

 projects must be so arranged that they would not delay or interfere with 

 the rapid prosecution of projects usable against Japan. 



The memorandum pointed out that the fall of Germany would materially 

 alter the military picture. Some types of weapons needed in the German 

 war would not be of equal importance in the war with Japan or would 

 not be completed in time to be useful, and, therefore, research in some of 

 the fields might well be transferred to the Services or terminated by OSRD. 



He pointed out that termination of OSRD responsibility on NDRC 

 projects meant termination of the project itself only in those cases in which 

 the project was neither potentially usable against Japan nor of long-range 

 continuing interest sufficient so that the Services were willing to take it 

 over. NDRC personnel were expected to be willing to assist the Services 

 by advice and consultation in connection with transferred projects to the 

 extent that their advice might be requested and their time might permit. 

 Projects were to be divided among the following classes: 



