DEMOBILIZATION OF OSRD 303 



personnel with whom they worked, but no program was to be considered 

 as definite until after it had been recommended by the NDRC as a whole 

 and approved by the Director. 



The memorandum was discussed by NDRC at its meeting on October 3, 

 1944. By that time it had become apparent that the divisions were having 

 difficulty in classifying their projects under Group 2 because of the uncer- 

 tainty as to the date on which the defeat of Germany would occur. The 

 designation of those projects which would be completed in three or four 

 months after the defeat of Germany would be quite different if that defeat 

 were assumed for November 1944, than it would if it were assumed for 

 July 1945. The point had purposely been left open by Bush who wished to 

 avoid anything which might be taken as an estimate as to the exact date 

 on which the collapse of Germany would occur. When NDRC attempted 

 to apply the memorandum of September 13, it found its program closely 

 tied to the assumption as to the date of the German collapse. In view of 

 the need for having the divisions and panels prepare their recommendations 

 on a uniform basis, NDRC had to make an assumption of the date when 

 Germany would fall. The date assumed was November 15, 1944, which 

 meant that projects in Group 2(a) would normally be those scheduled for 

 completion before February 28, 1945, and those in Group 2(b) would be 

 those scheduled for completion subsequent to February 28, 1945. 



Later events proved the assumption to be wrong. Germany did not col- 

 lapse about November 15; instead the Battle of the Bulge, which threw 

 a part of the American forces into retreat, started December 16, 1944. 



The Division and Panel Chiefs were instructed by NDRC on September 

 22, 1944, to prepare their termination programs in accordance with the Bush 

 memorandum of September 13. At the same time the Committee instituted 

 a more rigid control over the acceptance of new research projects submitted 

 by the Services. While NDRC had maintained its complete freedom to 

 accept or reject projects submitted by the Army and the Navy, in practice 

 for over four years the decision of the Division Chiefs to accept projects 

 (they rarely refused them) was not reviewed by NDRC, although it had 

 reviewed recommendations of Division Chiefs that projects be refused. 

 Beginning in October 1944, however, every new project was passed upon 

 by NDRC as a whole, although it did permit the acceptance without such 

 review of extensions of existing projects which involved merely the devel- 

 opment of specific devices based on research already accomplished. 



Bush requested the Secretaries of War and Navy each to name one man 

 with whom he could discuss termination problems. The Secretary of War 

 designated Brigadier General W. A. Borden, Director of the New Develop- 

 ments Division, and the Secretary of the Navy designated Rear Admiral 

 Furer. Under date of September 5, 1944, General Borden informed Bush 

 that while the War Department was in full accord with timely planning 



