324 ORGANIZING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH FOR WAR 



time for use in the current war, many others were rejected for the purely 

 formal reason that the work desired was already under way in connection 

 with some other request, 



Shordy after its establishment NDRC discovered that there were areas in 

 which the Army and the Navy did not exchange information. Faced with 

 a common problem, each Service worked out its own solution, and in some 

 cases declined to apprise the other of that solution. The most probable reason 

 for the refusal to exchange information in certain fields was the feeling on 

 the part of the more advanced Service that the less advanced would not keep 

 its secrets. NDRC did not conceive its mission to be the funneling of infor- 

 mation from one Service to the other. As a result of NDRC operations, 

 however, many barriers to a complete interchange of information between 

 the Services were lowered. This was brought about usually by the willing- 

 ness of that Service which was behind in a particular area to seek advice and 

 assistance from OSRD. Concentration upon the problems of the lagging 

 Service enabled OSRD to help bring it abreast or ahead of the other Service 

 and thus break down the reluctance to exchange information. 



The degree of independence of each other enjoyed by the various Bureaus 

 of the Navy and Services of the Army made it appear at times as if there 

 were as many armies and navies as there were bureaus and services. In 

 some cases there was an underlying resentment of the intrusion of a group 

 of civilians into an area theretofore reserved for men in uniform. In such 

 matters as failure to provide necessary test facilities a non-co-operating Serv- 

 ice could make it extremely difficult for OSRD to function effectively. At 

 the other extreme, there were some Bureaus and Services which were almost 

 embarrassingly co-operative. Not only were they glad to turn projects over 

 to OSRD, they were even reluctant to see OSRD withdraw from the picture 

 when its proper job had been completed. This took the form of an insistence 

 that OSRD, having completed its development work, could better produce 

 or procure the end item than could the requesting Service and a consequent 

 insistence that OSRD remain active in the field although its primary func- 

 tion had been completed. 



It will be interesting to see what permanent contribution to the Services 

 will result from the OSRD experience. In the midst of war it is natural that, 

 because of their preoccupation with the operations of the war, the armed 

 services should not undertake to reorient their thinking on research and 

 development. With the cessation of hostilities the pressure for improvement 

 is removed, and inertia coupled with the resistance of officers who believe 

 that the existing system is best makes change extremely difficult. When the 

 period of inevitable reduction in the amount of money available for the 

 military services actually arrives, there is a fair chance that the officers in 

 charge of research and development will concentrate upon protecting the 

 operations in their own laboratories or otherwise within their close control, 



