RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 329 



out a system for the proper handling of scientific manpower. The men re- 

 sponsible for getting recruits into the Army and the Navy seemed far 

 removed from the men who were responsible for developing the weapons 

 with which the war was to be fought. The two operations were carried on 

 with great independence of each other and with no one working out an 

 intelligent system to permit the objective of the one to be accomplished with- 

 out endangering the objective of the other. 



In modern wars new and improved weapons may well prove decisive. 

 For the development or improvement of such weapons in time of war, a 

 country must depend largely upon its existing reserve of scientists or those 

 in the course of training when the war breaks out. This group should be 

 recognized and treated as any other national asset. They should not only be 

 permitted, they should be forced to work on the development of instruments 

 of warfare and should not be squandered in capacities where men of other 

 training could be used as effectively. 



This is not to suggest that all scientists should be kept out of uniform. 

 It may be that the exact opposite is the proper answer and that immediately 

 upon the outbreak of war all scientists should be inducted into the armed 

 services and placed under the instructions of a scientific high command. 

 The problem is as important as it is difficult. It should be faced squarely in 

 the immediate future and the decision as to the proper method of handling 

 scientific manpower made well in advance of the time when it may be put 

 into effect. Though the answer to the problem is not immediately apparent, 

 it is clear that to handle scientific manpower in any future war as clumsily 

 as it was handled in World War II will be to invite national disaster. 



The most effective use of manpower reserved for scientific research is also 

 a problem of continuing difficulty. OSRD attained speed in research by 

 granting autonomy to the divisions. Freedom to make decisions at the 

 operating level was essential, but it had as a disadvantage that vested inter- 

 ests in continuing a particular line of research tended to arise. Persons not 

 sufficiently acquainted with the complete research program understandably 

 attached undue significance to the portion with which they were connected, 

 with the result that some programs were probably continued beyond the 

 point of diminishing returns. Proper balance between centralized authority 

 and autonomy is difficult to attain, but as the manpower situation becomes 

 more critical, the correct decision becomes more essential. Had the war 

 continued for a much longer period, OSRD might well have been forced 

 to withdraw some portion of the autonomy granted the divisions. 



Crash procurement. The Army and the Navy are organized for war in 

 terms of large bodies of men requiring huge amounts of standardized equip- 

 ment which must be obtained in the necessary quantities within narrow 

 time limits and must be designed for servicing with minimum delay and 

 confusion. Unfortunately in gearing to large things, neither department has 



