FORMATION OF A METHOD (1828-1852) 21 



'deduction' in inductive method probably survives in an 1849 

 paper'*^ which considers, as an example, the method used in 

 physics. Having observed many falling bodies, on what basis does 

 the physicist proceed to formulate the law of gravity? He must 

 assume, if he is not to fall into a Humean scepticism, that 'the 

 same cause always produces the same effects'. It is on the basis of 

 this postulate that 'He has seen the universal within the particular 

 which contains it . . .'"^^ and that he makes a hidden deduction, 

 generalizing from his observations. ^^ It is the axiom of causality 

 which ultimately makes induction possible, ^i 



Thus, despite his criticisms of rationalistic method and idealistic 

 metaphysics, Taine never lost sight of a Spinozistic vision of the 

 universe as unified and knowable; this found expression in the 

 rhapsodic concluding paragraphs of The Classic Philosophers, 

 which speak of 'the external axiom', and in the concluding chapter 

 of On Intelligence^ where this axiom appears as 'the explanatory 

 reason of things'. Based on a proposition of identity, it is the key- 

 stone of his metaphysical arch and thus provides the ultimate 

 philosophical justification of his critical method. 



The Problem of Freedom: Psychology and History 



These, then, were Taine's first rough formulations of his con- 

 cept of scientific method and of the metaphysical position on 

 which that method was based. As has already been indicated, 

 the two chief areas which he explored, in an attempt to apply 

 and develop his type of criticism, were psychology and history, 

 broadly conceived. ^^ Since the search for causes was central to his 

 method, it was natural that he should be led to a kind of deter- 

 minism. Characteristically, however, this concept in Taine was 

 far from mechanistic, involving rather (in two essays 'On Liberty', 

 from his first and last years at the Normal School) a subtle psycho- 

 logical analysis of the problem of choice. 



As might be expected, the first of these, from the period when 

 Spinoza's influence was still fresh, had some of the cocksure com- 

 bativeness of youth, beginning: 'Every human act is necessary.' 

 But by April, 1851, Taine was more conciliatory in his tone, 

 writing of a 'free necessity' and a fixed or 'regulated freedom' 

 ('liberte reglee'), though the conclusion remained substantially 

 the same. 53 



For Taine, the problem of freedom arose when an indi- 

 vidual's various 'tendencies' (habits, instincts, desires, and 



