32 THE PROBLEM IN TAINE 



20 y^ ^ c^^ 11^ 129, to fidouard de Suckau. 



21 V. & C, II, 304-305, to Cornells de Witt, our italics. 



22 Essai sur Tite-Live, pp. vii-viii. 



23 'La philosophic de Taine', in Hippolyte Taine: £tudes et Documents^ p. 75. 

 This essay, which stressed Taine's indebtedness to Spinoza, was shown to Taine 

 in 1 89 1, shortly before his death; he responded with an approving letter {ibid., 

 pp. 81-83). 



24 Appendix A, 'Bourbon College'. 



25 V. & C, I, 67, Note 2, and 75. 



26 V. & a, I, 115. 



27 Chevrillon, p. 50, Note. 



28 From the Introduction to 'On Human Destiny', V. & C, I, 25. 



29 V. & C, I, 56. 



30 V. & a, I, 57- 



31 Appendix B, 'The Question of Taine's Positivism'. 



32 Appendix A, 'Criticisms of Spinoza and Descartes'. 



33 V. & C, I, 83. 



34 Ethics, Proposition XXIX, Part I. 



35 Ibid., Proposition VII, Part II. 



36 Appendix A, 'Perception and Conception'. 



37 Appendix A, 'Criticisms of Descartes and Aristotle'. 



38 V. & C, I, 117, our italics. 



39 V. & C, I, 117. 



40 Chevrillon, p. 94. 



41 Ibid., p. loi. 



'^^ Appendix A, 'Introduction and the Absolute'. 



43 Chevrillon, p. 98. 



44 Appendix A, 'Metaphysical Systems'. 



45 Chevrillon, p. 393. 



46 Cf. Soren Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel in the course of which he 

 makes the following distinction: '. . .first, a logical system is possible; second, an 

 existential system is impossible'. ('Logical and Existential Systems', p. 640.) 



47 This chapter. Note 39. 



48 Discussed by Chevrillon, pp. 1 01-107. 



49 Ibid., p. 102. 



50 Cf. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, especially 

 Part Six: 'Postulates of Scientific Inference'. 



51 Appendix A, 'The "Eternal Axiom"'. 



52 See the conclusion to our Chapter I, and Chapter V, passim. 



53 Chevrillon, p. 113. 



54 Ibid., p. 114. 



55 Ibid., p. 115. 



56 Ibid., p. 117. 



57 Ibid., p. 117. 



58 As we shall see in his essay on Mill (Part I, Section XI: this essay can be 

 found in Book V of any standard edition of the History of English Literature, 

 where it was reprinted), Taine felt that one virtue of his inductive method was 

 that it left some room for an element of 'chance', which would seem to be a 

 breach in the armour of determinism. However, 'chance', like 'free will', was 



