34 THE PROBLEM IN TAINE 



79 V. & a, 1, 272. 



80 V. & a, 1, 282. 



81 V. & C, I, 285. 



82 K ^ C., I, 289. 



83 Lacombe: 'Spinoza had trained his spirit to the conception of an absolute 

 determinism, by giving it the idea of a world which might be derived from a 

 geometric formula and might display itself in inevitable corollaries. Hegel 

 confirmed and particularized that conception for him' (quoted by Rosea, 

 op. ciL, p. 39). 



8^* 'In brief, Taine aflSrms, with Hegel, the correspondence between being 

 and thought which Spinoza expressed in the clear and precise proposition: 

 "Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum'" (Rosea, 

 op. ciL, p. 105). 



85 'They are, in relation to us, what England was in relation to France in the 

 time of Voltaire. I find there enough ideas to supply the needs of an entire 

 century, and if it were not for my anxieties on the subject of the examination 

 for a fellowship in literature which I am going to attempt next year, I should 

 find peace and a sufficient occupation in the company of these great thoughts' 

 {V. & C, I, 225-226). In a similar manner, Coleridge had imported the ideas 

 of German metaphysicians to Great Britain a generation earlier. 



86 Appendix A, 'The Disillusion with Hegel'. 



87 Ibid., p. V. 



88 'From all these points, it is evident that the road to Hegel is shorter 

 through Spinoza than it is through any other philosopher, not excepting Kant' 

 {ibid., p. 44). 



89 Chapters II, III, and IV. Some of the propositions in question are listed 

 in the 'Preface' {ibid., p. vii). 



90 Ibid., pp. v-vi. 



91 See Appendix A, 'Taine's Doctoral Theses'. 



92 See Appendix A, 'Criticisms of Spinoza and Descartes'. 



93 'On the one hand, he (Cassirer) tries to introduce a unity into a mass of 

 divergent currents of thought by constructing a synthesis in terms of a charac- 

 teristic "style" or "ideal type" of thinking. On the other, he finds unification in 

 terms of the new problems forced on men — forced primarily, in his inter- 

 pretation, by the advance of scientific knowledge and the new conceptions of 

 truth to which that advance leads. . . . The first can be called, in his own terms, 

 a "substantial" or "structural" conception; the second is "functional".' (John 

 Herman Randall, Jr., 'Cassirer's Theory of History as Illustrated in His 

 Treatment of Renaissance Thought', pp. 726-727.) 



94 Conclusion of The Classic Philosophers. 



95 op. cit., Chapter III, 'Theorie de I'essence ou des causes'. 



96 Ibid., p. 421. 



97 Ibid., pp. 248-257. Cf. Appendix B. 



9^ Ibid., p. 426. Cf. Appendix A, 'The "Eternal Axiom'" and 'Taine's 

 "Abstraction" vs. Hegel's "Begriff"'. 



99 Ibid., p. 427. 



100 Op. ciL, p. 36. 



101 Appendix A, 'Induction and the Absolute', Note 53. 



102 Appendix A, 'Criticisms of Descartes and Aristotle', Note 45. 



