FORMATION OF A METHOD (1828-1852) 35 



103 Myers associates the distinction between abstract and concrete with 

 Spinoza's distinction between the true and the false infinite [op. cit., pp. 38-39) : 

 'the false infinite is allied with abstraction' (p. 39). Taine's student speculations 

 on the infinite, however, had not accepted Spinoza's distinction, but had 

 retained the derivation of infinity from experience, precisely through the process 

 of abstraction, described as follows: T have all the materials now for the idea of 

 the infinite, because I have the proposition: every dimension is divisible into 

 (further) dimensions. Now in this proposition the attribute contains the sub- 

 ject, so that it necessarily possesses the property of providing the occasion for a 

 proposition of the same nature. . . . We do not perceive here the infinite in 

 itself: no spirit can exhaust the terms of an infinite series. But we perceive the 

 causes of the infinite. Knowing the essence of the series, that is to say, the 

 necessity which each term contains of producing another, we arrive at the 

 infinite as a conclusion therefrom, that is to say, at the impossibility where that 

 essence is of having a term which does not produce a subsequent one.' (Chevril- 

 ron, op. cit., p. no. Note.) 



104 Appendix A, 'Taine's "Abstraction" versus Hegel's "BegrifT"'. 



105 Consider, for example, Taine's criticism of Mill's version of scientific 

 method, which contrasted what he called the 'English' and the 'German' 

 methods (Rosea, op. cit., p. 315) : the latter (meaning particularly that of Hegel), 

 though it had to be made more precise, had the virtue of recognizing the 

 importance of general laws; thus mere 'experience' was not enough, and 

 induction had to be clarified by processes of abstraction and deduction. 

 Applied to history, these are the means by which we gain insights into parti- 

 cular facts. On the one hand, the historian must base his generalizations on 

 the labours of the monographer, the collector of specimens; on the other hand, 

 the historian must be able to decide which specimens are significant and 

 decisive {ibid., p. 317, quoting Derniers Essais, pp. 167-168 and 159-160). 

 Despite affinities with Hegel, this gives the matter quite a different emphasis. 



106 Ibid., p. 299. 



107 In 1864, after having completed the History of English Literature, Taine 

 reiterated, in a letter to Cornells de Witt (17 May, 1864), that his own 'master 

 idea' had been to break down this distinction between the sciences and the 

 humanities (see this chapter. Note 21). We shall turn, presently, to the labours 

 of that decade to see in what fashion Taine realized this idea in practice. 



108 F. «Sf C, I, 304. 



109 Our principle of organization, beginning in Part Two, will be logical, 

 rather than strictly chronological, with the emphasis placed on the major 

 problems which Taine's system presents for a philosophy of criticism. However, 

 the reader interested in the main facts concerning Taine's later biography and 

 publications will find them summarized in the 'Selected Bibliography of Taine's 

 Works, With Biographical Notes' (Bibliography A). 



