ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 45 



especially have, of course, become much more sophisticated in 

 the course of the last century (Chapter VII, 'Biological Heredity'). 



Further, Taine's deductive habit has led him, on the basis of the 

 metaphysics which he derived primarily from Spinoza and 

 Hegel, to a vision of the unity of all things which is more of an 

 article of faith than a 'fact' he has proven. Thus, 'Little by little 

 the pyramid of causes takes shape, and the scattered facts receive 

 from the philosophic architecture their links and positions.' 26 

 The alternative of a pluralism of causal series is one which he 

 does not consider (Chapter X, 'The Problem of Causation'). 

 Instead, in almost rhapsodic terms — to the extent that Taine's 

 logically neat prose can achieve rhapsody — M. Paul pictures a 

 situation in which continued study of civilizations will enable us 

 to arrive at 'the master faculty' of each nation scientifically, 

 unlike 'the metaphysicians' who 'attempt to define it at the first 

 try and without passing through experience'. ^^ 



The conclusion of M. Paul's discussion is an apotheosis of the 

 nineteenth-century ideal of science, in the spirit of Spinoza.^s 

 It is a vision of unity which has something of the sublime about it, 

 and it is difficult not to share something of Taine's enthusiasm. 

 However, enthusiasm is not a strictly scientific virtue, and 'the 

 eternal axiom' is more of a rationalist postulate than a scientific 

 fact. Conscious himself that he had, perhaps, stepped out of his 

 scientific role, Taine concludes on a humorous note: 'It was late; 

 my two friends dismissed me, and I went to sleep. Dear reader, 

 you have wanted to do the same for the last two hours.' ^9 



Analysis and synthesis; induction and deduction; the idea of 

 cause; history and psychology; abstraction, hypothesis, and 

 verification; formulas, types, real definitions, and master facul- 

 ties; race and milieu; the hierarchy of necessities and the over- 

 riding unity of 'the eternal axiom' — these are the chief elements 

 in Taine's first considerable essays 'On Method', and they are all 

 concepts which we have already encountered, in more or less 

 developed forms, during his years at the Normal School. Forming 

 a highly unified pattern, they received various emphases in turn 

 in the many essays on method which Taine was to write, on 

 various occasions, during the decade which followed. 



