70 ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM 



(29 March, 1866), the editor of that journal observed 'that 



Taine makes a number of concessions there to the partisans of 



freedom'. 61 Were there such concessions? If so, how important 



were they? 



In contrast to previous prefaces, which stressed the ideas of 



causation and of unity (see our Chapter IV, 'Taine RepHes to 



Critics of "Abstraction"'), this one began by making a sharp 



distinction between a method and a system: 'Several critics have 



honoured me, some by opposing, some by approving of what they 



like to call my system. My claim has never gone so far as to say 



that I have a system: I am trying at most to follow a method. A 



system is an explication of the whole, and implies a job completed; 



a method is a way of working and implies a job to be done. I have 



wanted to work in a certain direction and manner, nothing 

 more. '62 



Perhaps one of the points the editor of the Journal had in mind 

 as a 'concession to liberty' was really a change in terminology. 

 The first 'Preface' asked the question Why? and spoke of causes; 

 the second version began by seeking, not causes, but ^dependencies 

 and conditions'.^^ With greater patience and in greater detail than 

 the first, the second 'Preface' takes the critical reader through the 

 steps of classification and abstraction which lead to the central 

 fact of a certain 'psychological state\^^ Passing from the individual 

 to society, Taine develops here pretty much the same philosophy 

 of history as that of the 'Introduction' to the History. He does not 

 stop with 'dependencies' (cf. 'the law of mutual dependence'), 

 but goes on to state his theory of causation. ^5 History considers 

 relationships in their temporal aspects: 'One step remains to be 

 taken. Until now, the conjunction oi simultaneous things only has 

 been in question; now, we are concerned with the conjunction of 

 successive things. The reader was able to verify that moral things 

 have their dependencies, like physical things; at present he must 

 verify the fact that, like physical things, they have their conditions.' ^^ 

 Since, as Taine claims, the historical conditions we study in this 

 fashion are 'sufficient and necessary', they are in effect the same 

 causes of which he had previously written: a cause might be 

 defined as 'a necessary and sufficient condition'. Furthermore, 

 these 'dependencies' and 'conditions' are not empty abstractions 

 but 'living forces' which together form 'the choir invisible of 

 which the old poets speak, which moves through things and by 

 which the eternal universe throbs'. ^7 The terms and order of 



