174 SCIENCE AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT 



contemporary science he made it wrong. If we are not, perhaps, justified in 

 assuming that a consequent sense of intellectual guilt made him fumble, we 

 at least can see the unlucky results in his poem, and can have an aesthetic 

 opinion accordingly.' From a review of Lovejoy's Essays in the History of Ideas, 

 in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. IX, No. 4 (October, 1948), p. 445. 



8 Cf. our Chapter VI, 'Art as Imitation and Expression'. 



9 Lectures, First Series, p. 197. 



10 Ibid., pp. 201-209. 



11 Cf. our Chapter XI, 'Taine's Position . . .'. 



12 Lectures, First Series, p. 261. 



13 Ibid., p. 180, our italics. 



14 Cf. our Chapter XI, 'The Issue of Substance'. 



15 Lectures, First Series, p. 261, our italics. 



16 Cf. our Chapter X, 'What Does a Critic Analyze?' 



17 We have had to correct John Durand's translation here. The French runs: 

 tantot creee de toutes pieces . . .'; 'at one time drawn from every detail' does 

 not convey the meaning. 



18 Appendix E, I: 'Scales of Permanence'. 



19 Ibid., I, B: 'Social Force'. 



20 Ibid., I, A: 'Individual Force'. 



21 Ibid., II: 'Scales of Development'. 



22 Ibid., Ill: 'Diagram of Total Forces'. 



23 Lectures, First Series, pp. 351-353. 



24 Cf. Note 13, this chapter. 



25 Cf. Rosca's discussions in the second part of his book {op. cit.), especially 

 Section I ('Nature de I'art') of his Chapter VI. 



26 Lectures, First Series, p. 351. 



27 Ibid., p. 348. 



28 See, for example, the formula for Rembrandt: 'the idea of an expiring 

 light in a humid atmosphere and the mournful sentiment of poignant reality' 

 {ibid., p. 350). Though extremely suggestive, this seems, like so many of Taine's 

 other formulas, excessively abstract and lifeless. 



29 That Taine means to point a direction and develop a method, is evident 

 from the fact that he concludes with his usual recognition of limits and com- 

 plexity: 'Criticism labours in vain, it cannot define all the results that flow from 

 it; . . . life is the same in works of genius and in those of nature; ... no 

 analysis can reach the end of it. But in these as well as in those observation 

 verifies the essential concordances, the reciprocal dependencies, the final 

 direction and the harmonies of the ensemble but whose entire detail it does not 

 succeed in distinguishing' {ibid., pp. 350-351). 



30 Consider the following self-criticism: 'If I had had the necessary leisure. 

 ... I should have treated ethics as I have treated aesthetics, experimentally, 

 analyzing and comprehending the chief systems of morality practised (and not 

 only those professed) in China, among the Buddhists, among the Greeks in the 

 age of Cimon and the Romans in the age of Cato the Elder, in primitive 

 Christianity, in France under Saint Louis, in the Italy of 1500, in the Spain of 

 1600, etc.; and I should have tried to finish with a chapter entitled the Ideal 

 in Life analogous to that which I have written on the Ideal in ArC {V. & C, 

 IV, 172-173, 4 November, 1883). In principle, at least, Taine should have 



