igo SCIENCE AND AESTHETIC JUDGMENT 



initiative towards the maintenance of objective values. . . . Thus "art" in 

 the general sense which I require is any selection by which the concrete facts 

 are so arranged as to elicit attention to particular values which are realisable 

 by them. . . . Accordingly, the true rationalism must always transcend itself 

 by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration. ... In the higher types, 

 where life appears, there is greater complexity. Thus, though there is a com- 

 plex, enduring pattern, it has retreated into deeper recesses of the total fact. 

 In a sense, the self-identity of a human being is more abstract than that of a 

 crystal. ... In truth, the field of perception and the perceiving mind are 

 abstractions which, in the concrete, combine into the successive bodily events' 

 {Science and the Modern World, pp. 199-201). Whitehead sees in aesthetic experi- 

 ence a means of assuring that, despite the inevitability of abstraction, modern 

 men will not lose sight of concreteness and immediacies. 



18 Cf. our Chapter X, Notes 13 and 40. 



19 Cf. our Chapter XII, p. 171. 



20 Cf. the criticisms of Ernst Cassirer (this chapter, Note 6) and Susanne K. 

 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, 

 Pelican Books, 1948, especially Chapter 9, 'The Genesis of Artistic Import': 

 'There is a widespread and familiar fallacy, known as the "genetic fallacy", 

 which arises from the historical method in philosophy and criticism: the error 

 of confusing the origin of a thing with its import, of tracing the thing to its most 

 primitive form and then calling it "merely" this archaic phenomenon' 

 (p. 201). 



21 Thus, in a recent anthology of critical essays, Mark Schorer organizes his 

 selections around the concepts of Form, Source, and End, to which correspond, 

 roughly, the philosophies which consider art chiefly as Imitation, Expression, 

 and Communication {Criticism, p. viii). But since every work of art must neces- 

 sarily have a form, a source, and an end, all of these relations may be, and 

 should be, considered by the critic. 



22 John Fiske stressed the inadequacy of Taine's psychology: 'We think the 

 foregoing explanation correct enough, so far as it goes, though it deals with the 

 merest rudiments of the subject, and really does nothing toward elucidating 

 the deeper mysteries of artistic production. For this is needed a profounder 

 psychology than M. Taine's.' ('A Philosophy of Art', p. 301.) A more recent 

 and thorough-going critique of Taine's psychology, from the viewpoint of 

 Husserl's 'phenomenology', is contained in Jean-Paul Sartre, U Imagination, 

 passim, especially Chapter II. Also, cf. our Chapter IX, 2iho\c, passim. 



23 'The Aesthetic Analysis of a Work of Art: an Essay on the Structure and 

 Superstructure of Poetry', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. VII, 

 No. 4 (June, 1949), pp. 275-293. 



24 'We have tried to show by concrete example how the analysis of an 

 aesthetic fact, as well as the experiments or comparisons that complete the 

 analysis, leads us automatically to the judgment of the value of this fact.' 

 {Ibid., p. 293.) 



25 Among his predecessors in this scientific approach, he cites 'the "conver- 

 gence of effects" to produce "the ideal in art" as prescribed in Taine's natural- 

 ism.' {Ibid., p. 275.) 



26 Ibid., p. 275, Lalo's italics. Cf. the first tAvo sections of this chapter and the 

 conclusion of Chapter X. 



