OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR. 587 



tract right to select nonmineral lieu lands within the indemnity 

 limits and the TTnitcd States could not defeat such right by with- 

 drawal of the lands, prior to survey and selection, for possible in- 

 clusion in a national reservation. 



In United States v. Kern River Co. et al (264 Fed., 412), the Cir- 

 cuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the act of 

 March 3, 1891, limiting suits to vacate patents to public lands does 

 not apply to a suit to set aside the approval by the Secretary of the 

 Interior of a canal company^s maps of location filed to obtain a right 

 of way across public lands where such approval was secured by mis- 

 representations ; that statutes of limitation do not run against the 

 Government 'in the absence of express statutory provision; that, if 

 the statute is ap])licable to a class of suits only, it will not be ex- 

 tended to other cases by implication; that the approval by the Sec- 

 retary of the Interior of a canal company's maps of location filed 

 as a basis of right of way through a forest reserve was obtained b}'^ 

 fraud, where at the time of the original and amended application its 

 attention was called to two statutes, one granting a right of way for 

 irrigation and the other for development of power, but falsely cer- 

 tified that the right of way was desired solely for the purposes de- 

 scribed in the act lelating to rights of way for irrigation purposes; 

 and that if the approval by the Secretary of the Interior of a canal 

 company's maps of location of a right of way through a forest re- 

 serve was given with full knowledge of the fact that the canal was 

 to be constructed for power purposes and that the compau}^ had not 

 complied with the statute relative to rights of Avay for such purposes, 

 he exceeded his authority, and the validity of his approval might be 

 challenged in a suit to set aside such approval and restrain use of 

 the right of way. 



The case of United States v. South River Lumber Co. was a suit in 

 equity in the western district of Virginia. One Guthrie had agn ed 

 to convey land to the Government under the act of March 1, 1911 

 (36 Stat., 961), known as the Weeks law, such conveyance to be in 

 fee, subject only to certain mineral reservations. After the agree- 

 ment for purchase had been executed b}' the vendor and the Sec- 

 retary, the vendor granted the use of a right of wa}' to the railroad 

 company. After title vested in the Government, the company re- 

 fused to remove its railroad from the land. By decree dated Feb- 

 I'uary 28, 1920. the company was enjoined from operating its rail- 

 road over the land or from attempting to use the right of way, and it 

 was allowed- 90 days within which to remove the railroad ties and 

 railroad apparatus from the land. Thereafter the company applied 

 fo!' and received a permit for the right of way. 



United States v. Cowart was a suit in equity to restrain the defend- 

 ant from cutting timV)er on lands agreed to be sold to the (iiovern- 

 ment under the act of March 1, 1911 (36 Stat., 961), commonly known 

 as the Weeks forestry law. The \endor thereafter coiiveyod the 

 lands to one Cowart, who began cutting timber thereon. C(mdemna- 

 tion proceedings wore in.stituted and the suit for injunction was filed 

 to restrain the timber rutting. The court granted the injunction. 

 The case is of interest in that an action by the (iovernniciit was sus- 

 tained prior to the acquisition of title by the United States, and 

 while the Government was not in i)ossession, in order that its rights 

 initiated by the condemnation proceedings might be protected. 



