THE SOLICITOR. 853 



and where the shipment had feed, rest, and water. This was not 

 done in this case. It might well be contended, therefore, that the 

 terminal company acted at its peril if it transported this consign- 

 ment farther where the billing failed to give any information as to 

 watering, feeding, and resting. In United States v. St. Joseph 

 Stock Yards Co. (Circular No. 25, Office of the Solicitor) the court 

 expressly and emphatically liolds that there is a duty resting on con- 

 necting carriers to inquire as to previous confinement. In Pierson v. 

 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (100 Pac, 999, 1001), the supreme court of 

 Washington said: 



The federal statute covers this question. It provides that in estimating the time 

 during which the animals have been confined without rest on connecting roads shall 

 be included; thus making it the duty of the connecting carrier to inquire concerning 

 such time when the animals are received by it, if the fact does not appear on the way- 

 bills submitted to it. 



If the statute imposes a duty upon common carriers of live stock, 

 and if such carriers are chargeable with knowledge, not merely of 

 what they actually knew, but as well with knowledge of facts which 

 they might have ascertained upon reasonable inquirv (in accord, 

 United States r. Fort Worth Belt Ky. Co., Circular No. 1 i. Office of the 

 Solicitor; United States v. Colorado and Southern B.j. Co.; Circular 

 No. 7, Office of the Solicitor), how could it be decided that the 

 defendant, in the Stock Yards Terminal case, did not knowingly and 

 willfully violate the law when it appeared- simply that the company 

 did not have actual knowledge of how long the live stock had oeen 

 previously confined ? 



A group of three important cases, invohdng practically the same 

 issues, was also decided b}' the circuit court of appeals for the eighth 

 circuit at the close of the past fiscal year (Wabash 11. K. Co. v. United 

 States, 178 Fed., 5; Circular No. 35, Office of the Solicitor; Atchison, 

 Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. United States, 178 Fed., 12; 

 Circular No. 36, Office of the Solicitor; Missouri, Kansas and Texas 

 R. R. Co. V. United States, 178 Fed., 16; Circular No. 37, Ofl^ce of 

 the Sohcitor). The most important points in all these cases were 

 as to whether an extension request, pro^^ded for in section 1 of the 

 act, might be made on a railroad form, though separate from the 

 bill of lading or other railroad form, antl whether such a request 

 might be made before the shipment started. The circuit court of 

 appeals held that Congress intended simply to prevent the extension 

 request from being concealed in some railroad form, used for another 

 purpose, and thus withdraw the attention of the signer from it. 

 This was in accordance with the ruhng of this Office, as stated in the 

 opinion. It was held by the court that such requests niight be 

 made out by shippers or their agents, on forms supplied by the 

 railroad companies, provided these complied with the other require- 

 ments of the act. It was also held that such a request might be 

 made out before the shipment started. Counsel for the Government 

 contended that the recpiests must be intluced by an unforeseen con- 

 tingency arising during the transportation. The court held, however, 

 that extension of time beyond twenty-eight hours was permitted 

 without a request, upon an unforeseen cause of delav, and the grant- 

 ing of a reouest only upon the happening of an un^)reseen cause of 

 delay would have created a double exception to the law, which is 

 repugnant. 



